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The Effects of In-Group Bias and Decision Aids on Auditors’ Evidence Evaluation
Eileen Zalkin Taylor
ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of in-group bias and decision aid use on auditor
judgments, confidence, and decisions in an analytical procedures task. In-group bias, a
product of Social Identity Theory, may impair auditor independence by influencing
auditor judgments. Auditors rely on client representations to support their opinion of the
financial statements; however, clients are sometimes former auditors of the external audit
firm. This prior relationship could lead the auditor to exhibit unwarranted trust of client
representations. In an online mixed design experiment using staff and senior auditors, I
test whether auditor judgments, confidence in those judgments, and decisions to extend
testing differ based on a client’s prior affiliation. I find that there is insufficient evidence
of in-group bias in auditor judgments, confidence, or decisions. Lack of support could be
due to the small sample size. In the same experiment, I give auditors access to a decision
aid. Practice and prior literature suggest using decision aids should improve audit
judgment. I find that a structured decision aid improves audit judgments and decisions for
all auditors, and improves confidence for auditors who initially made good judgments.
Audit managers can benefit from noting the usefulness of decision aids in improving
judgment.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This study examines whether in-group bias, an inclination to trust one’s own
group members, affects auditors’ judgments, confidence in those judgments, and
decisions in an analytical procedures task. It also explores whether a decision aid
successfully mitigates in-group bias and improves auditors’ decisions. Auditors perform
analytical procedures in which they gather information from multiple sources to justify
and explain changes in account balances; they often rely on client representations for
supporting evidence (Biggs et al. 1995). When evaluating client representations, auditors
must consider the client’s source reliability, which includes both competence and
objectivity (Hirst 1994).1 In-group bias, which occurs when group members extend
unjustified trust to other group members (Hewstone et al. 2002), could impact this
evaluation.2 As companies hire members of their external audit firm to work in key
financial positions, former auditors become clients, yet current auditors may still consider
them group members. The resulting in-group bias could lead auditors to overrate a
client’s objectivity, which would lead to an inappropriately high source reliability
judgment. Auditors could conclude that evidence is sufficient when it is insufficient,
prematurely end the search for additional or corroborating evidence, or exhibit an
unjustified confidence in the final audit opinion. All of these outcomes could result in an
ineffective audit.
1

Objectivity, in this context, simply refers to the client’s willingness to be truthful to the auditor. In other
auditing literature, objectivity is also a measure of bias in an individual’s judgment. In this study, I am
exploring the effect of a bias on the auditor’s judgment of the client’s objectivity.
2
Biases in auditor judgments, specifically those related to the auditor’s evaluation of source reliability,
have been the topic of several auditing studies (Anderson et al. 2003, Anderson et al. 1994, Bamber 1983,
Hirst 1994).
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Companies often hire employees from their external audit firm, (Beasley et al.
2000; Bleed 2002; Lennox 2005). In several of the most recent audit failures, highranking accounting personnel were also alumnae of the company’s external audit firm
(Barrionuevo 2002). Congress has recognized the potential for in-group bias to influence
auditor judgments and has restricted public companies from hiring their external auditors
in positions of financial authority for a one-year period. 3 AICPA Ethics Interpretation
101-2 cautions that client hiring of their external auditors might impair independence
(AICPA 2005). The Independence Standards Board also warned that auditor
independence could be threatened by their familiarity or prior longstanding relationships
with attest client (Independence Standards Board 2000). While these bodies recognize ingroup bias as a threat, empirical studies of the phenomenon in auditing are scarce. King
(2002) demonstrated in-group bias among auditors in a behavioral experiment. Lennox
(2005) found that companies with affiliated executives (employees who were former
members of the current external audit firm) were more likely to receive a clean opinion
than companies without affiliated executives, and Menon and Williams (2004) found
evidence of abnormal accruals in firms with affiliated executives. These studies suggest
that auditors may exhibit in-group bias.
Even though the above studies suggest in-group bias exists among auditors, there
are some reasons why individual auditors may be immune to this bias. Auditors have
strict professional standards, training in professional skepticism and independence, are
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Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that the CEO, Controller, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer or person in an
equivalent position cannot have been employed by the company's audit firm during the 1-year period
preceding the audit (Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002).
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subject to public accountability, and must meet stringent exam requirements. These
factors suggest an auditor could accurately assess client objectivity, or lack thereof,
regardless of past associations. Indeed, Bamber et al. (1995) notes several studies which
suggest that auditors are less susceptible to psychological biases.
Whether and to what extent auditors demonstrate in-group bias toward former
audit team members is an empirical question. It is important to answer this question since
this bias could threaten the auditor’s professional judgment, resulting in an unacceptably
high risk of audit failure. Given the widespread practice of companies hiring their
external auditors, and considering the recent Congressional laws, I first test the extent of
in-group bias on auditor judgments and decisions. I then test whether a decision aid can
improve audit judgments.
Practitioners use decision aids to improve auditing (Bedard and Graham 2002).
These aids support decision-making by overcoming human information processing
limitations (Rose 2002), automating structured decisions (Abdolmohammadi 1991), and
providing models and data to assist the auditor in choosing between alternatives in semistructured tasks (Abdolmohammadi 1991). I use analytical procedures in this study
because they are semi-structured tasks: they have a reasonably well-defined problem,
with limited alternatives, requiring some judgment (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001;
Abdolmohammadi 1991). I supply auditors with a decision aid that lists plausible
explanations for a given account fluctuation. If in-group bias causes auditors to exhibit
unjustified trust, which results in an incorrect audit judgment, a decision aid could
provide the auditor with guidance regarding the correct judgment, thus mitigating the
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negative effect of in-group bias. In practice, this decision aid could be something as
simple as a listing of expected account relationships or something more complex, such as
an interactive computer model that provides a probability report. A decision aid can also
improve audit judgment in the absence of group bias by directing attention to relevant
indicators.
I use a mixed design experiment with one between-participants variable, group
affiliation (in and out) and one within-participants variable, decision aid (pre and post).
Senior and staff auditors evaluate a client-provided explanation for the results of an
analytical procedure; the client is either a former audit team member or a longstanding
client employee. Dependent variables, measured pre- and post-decision aid, include the
auditor’s plausibility judgment, his confidence in that judgment, and his decision about
how much to extend audit testing. After evaluating demographics (task experience, level,
and affiliation) as possible covariates, I analyze the data using the appropriate statistical
methods.
To summarize, first, I test for in-group bias in an audit context, exploring how this
bias affects auditor judgment, confidence in that judgment, and decisions to extend audit
testing. Second, I evaluate whether a decision aid is effective in improving audit
judgments, confidence and decisions. Based on data collected, there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that in-group bias exists among auditors performing an analytical
procedure. Further, there is no indication that in-group bias affects either confidence or
decisions to extend testing. Findings indicate that decision aid use improves auditor
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judgments and auditor decisions for all auditors, but only improves confidence for
auditors who initially provided a correct judgment.
One cannot conclude that insignificant findings indicate an absence of in-group
bias. The small sample size and use of nonparametric tests reduce the likelihood of
finding an effect, should one exist. Future research with a larger sample could yield
results that are more conclusive. Audit firms should be especially interested in the
findings related to the effectiveness of the decision aid in improving both judgments and
decisions. The simple decision aid used for this task offers a feasible and cost-effective
tool for practice improvement.
The dissertation continues as follows: Chapter 2 includes the literature review
and development of the hypotheses, Chapter 3 describes the method, discusses the
research design and provides results of the pilot test, Chapter 4 includes the statistical
analysis, and Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of results, limitations, and future
research..
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Introduction
This section provides an overview of the audit and psychology literature
pertaining to this study. The first part of this section focuses on a review of the audit
literature related to analytical procedures and the auditor’s judgment process during those
procedures. I use the Anderson and Koonce (1998) model, which is a two-step approach
including plausibility and sufficiency checks. I then integrate source reliability literature
from the audit field, focusing on the auditor’s judgment of client objectivity. I proceed to
review the recent studies on auditor affiliation, discussing how affiliation can impact the
audit process. I follow this discussion by a review of the seminal literature on social
identity theory (Tajfel 1981), moving toward a definition of inter-group bias, and finally
discussing how group biases can impact auditors. Hypotheses related to in-group bias are
then stated.
The second part of this section provides a discussion of the audit-related debiasing
literature, followed by a review of how decision aids can be used to improve auditor
judgment and decisions.
2.2 Analytical Procedures and Source Reliability Judgments
2.2.1 Analytical Procedures
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards require auditors to obtain sufficient,
competent, evidential matter to reasonably support their opinion of a client’s financial
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statement presentation and disclosures (AICPA 2005). AU Section 329 “Analytical
Procedures” defines these procedures as “…evaluations of financial information made
by a study of plausible relationships among both financial and nonfinancial data”
(AICPA 2005, 465). This standard requires auditors to perform analytical procedures in
both the planning and review stages of the audit (AICPA 2005). When used during
planning, analytical procedures help auditors identify accounts that need further
investigation, allowing them to budget more time and testing to these areas. AU Section
329.09 also suggests that auditors use analytical procedures as a substantive test during
fieldwork to obtain evidence about financial statement assertions (AICPA 2005).
Analytical review procedures require auditors to develop expectations about account
balances based on their knowledge of internal and external factors. These factors might
relate to industry averages, current economic indicators, changes in accounting or
operations policies, or firm-specific growth. After developing expectations, auditors
compare their expectations to financial statement assertions, investigating differences.
This investigation requires auditors to gather information from multiple sources. Auditors
must also have a complete understanding of how accounts are related, in order to assess
the reasonableness of account balance changes.
Practicing auditors commonly place great reliance on analytical procedures
(Anderson et al. 1994; Biggs et al. 1995). Hirst and Koonce (1996) conducted a field
study in which they interviewed 36 audit professionals (seniors, managers, and partners)
about the use of analytical procedures in practice. They found that auditors use analytical
procedures as a substantive test to determine account balance validity. Further, during
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substantive testing, auditors emphasize “…the explanation development /evaluation and
information search aspects…” of analytical procedures (Hirst and Koonce 1996, 476).
The study also notes that although auditors report improvements in judgment over time
(as they gain experience) they admit that even with additional experience their confidence
in evaluating client explanations remains low.
Auditors obtain explanations for unexpected fluctuations from multiple sources
(Anderson et al. 2003). Changes in balances may relate to external events (e.g., a change
in general economic indicators or competition), or may result from internal client
decisions (e.g., discontinuation of a product line or replacement of depreciated assets).
When changes result from external causes, auditors can probably gather evidence from
objective external sources. However, when changes result from internal management
decisions, auditors often rely on client explanations. In practice, Hirst and Koonce (1996)
find that while experienced auditors are more likely to self-generate possible explanations
before turning to the client, less experienced auditors are more likely to ask the client
first. Both experienced and novice auditors turn to the client either to confirm or to seek
explanations regarding the causes of observed fluctuations. The degree of reliance the
auditor places on these explanations depends on his assessment of the client’s objectivity.
2.2.2 The Judgment Process
According to the Anderson and Koonce (1998) model in Figure 1, auditors
proceed through a two stage process when evaluating evidence. Auditors start with a twostep plausibility check. In the first step, they assess whether an explanation is consistent
with the observed fluctuation. For example, if net income increases, an increase in sales
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would be a plausible reason; an increase in common stock would not be a plausible
reason. Once auditors judge a cause consistent with the fluctuation, they then consider
whether the cause is consistent with the available information. Did sales, in fact,
increase? If the evidence shows that sales decreased, this explanation would not be
consistent with the facts and auditors would judge this explanation implausible
(Anderson and Koonce 1998). After compiling a list of plausible hypotheses, auditors
perform the sufficiency evaluation task. This evaluation requires an assessment of how
much of the variation in the account is explained by the explanation overall.
Figure 1
Model of the Evaluation of Causes in Analytical Procedures
(Anderson and Koonce 1998, 3)

Plausibility Check

Is cause consistent with unexpected
fluctuation?

Is cause consistent with the
available information?

Sufficiency Check

Is cause of a sufficient magnitude to
account for substantially all of the
fluctuation?

Although prior research has found that auditors often fail to adequately assess
sufficiency (Anderson et al. 2003; Anderson and Koonce 1998; Hirst and Koonce 1996),
little research has examined auditors’ ability to assess plausibility. Since auditors
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recognize basic accounting relationships, it is likely that they would accurately complete
step one of the plausibility judgment (explanation is consistent with change in account
balance). However, because step two of the plausibility check requires auditors to search
for confirming evidence, they could fail to identify explanations that are inconsistent with
actual circumstances. Given a seemingly plausible client-provided explanation, auditors
could fail to complete step two accurately, independent confirmation that the hypothesis
fits the circumstances. The current study uses an explanation that is consistent with the
change in account balance, yet inconsistent with the actual facts (as evidenced by changes
in other account balances). To identify the explanation as implausible, auditors must
search beyond the account of interest.
Prior research suggests that experienced auditors can detect implausible
explanations when source objectivity is manipulated at two levels: client and some other
outside source (e.g., decision aid, external third party, audit team member) (Anderson et
al. 2003; Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994; Joyce and Biddle 1981). None considers the case
where the client is a former audit team member. In the current study, the auditor’s
judgment of the client’s objectivity depends on both the client’s former position as a
fellow audit team member and the client’s current position within his or her firm. The
client’s former position with the audit firm should increase the client’s objectivity
because the client (former auditor) has an understanding of proper financial statement
preparation and of the importance of providing a high-quality audit. The client’s current
position with the firm could decrease objectivity because the client could be motivated by
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bonuses and promotions related to strong financial results. In addition, the client could
also be motivated to falsify financial statements in order to cover up fraud.
2.2.3 Source Reliability Judgments
Auditors weigh client explanations based on their assessment of the client’s
source reliability. The source reliability judgment includes an evaluation of both
competence and objectivity (Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994). According to Hirst (1994),
“…competence means an individual’s ability to measure or interpret an item or event
accurately. Objectivity means the likelihood an individual will report his measurement or
interpretation truthfully, regardless of its accuracy” (p.114). Ceteris paribus, the level of
source reliability increases with the level of competence, as well as with the degree of
objectivity.
Source reliability judgments include an evaluation of both competence and
objectivity. Therefore, any bias that impairs auditor judgment about either the
competence or the objectivity of a source could reduce the audit’s effectiveness and
increase audit risk. When evaluating the competence of a client who was once an audit
team member, the auditor’s past interaction with that individual on audit engagements, as
well as the auditor’s knowledge of firm training and promotion policies, should result in
an accurate competence judgment. Further, an individual’s competence is unlikely to
decrease when he or she goes to work for a client firm.
Unlike competence, objectivity is subject to situational pressures. Clients,
although knowledgeable, might not be objective (Hirst 1994). Compensation plans,
promotion opportunities, and stock options provide motivation for clients to report
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untruthfully. AU 316, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit” requires
auditors to evaluate client assertions with professional skepticism, directing them to
inquire about management incentives, pressures and motivations (AICPA 2005).
Auditors must consider how these motivations can influence clients to provide untruthful
explanations. When evaluating the objectivity of a former audit team member, the current
auditor must consider how the ex-auditor’s objectivity may have changed, and how that
change may affect the client’s overall source reliability.
2.2.4 Clients’ Insider Knowledge of Audit Process
The potential for client deception is especially relevant when the client is a former
member of the current audit firm. A significant threat to financial reporting involves the
ex-auditor’s specialized knowledge of the continuing audit firm’s processes and
operations (Beasley et al. 2000). As a former audit team member, the client knows which
tasks lower-level auditors complete. He or she can apply this knowledge strategically to
hide his or her misdeeds, using certain accounts assigned to novice team members.
Further, the client knows the audit firm’s internal procedures for determining materiality,
evaluating evidence, and conducting substantive testing. While AICPA Ethics
Interpretation 101-2 contains a requirement that the ongoing engagement team consider
the necessity to modify engagement procedures, insider information does increase the
risk that the client can anticipate and subvert those procedures. Admittedly, although a
client might attempt to deceive the auditor, successful deception depends on the auditor’s
inability to detect the deception. The focus of this paper remains on the auditor’s
judgment of the plausibility of client explanations; the above discussion merely
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highlights the increased potential for a client to plan his deception, as well as the need for
auditors to effectively detect deception when it occurs.
2.3 Auditor Affiliation and Related Studies
Lack of independence is an often-cited cause of audit failure. In some salient audit
failures, the top executives at the client corporations were also past employees of the
firms that audited them. For example, in the Enron case, both Richard Causey, Chief
Accounting Officer, and Sherron Watkins, Vice President, were Andersen alumni
(Barrionuevo 2002). Being past employees of the audit firm, the concern is that these key
client personnel are able to exercise undue influence on the auditor, thereby impairing
auditor independence. The federal government has responded to the auditor affiliation
threat to independence by restricting the employment options of audit team members
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002). In addition, AICPA Ethics Interpretation 101-2 has
identified the hiring of an external auditor by the client firm to be a threat to
independence and suggests several mitigation techniques (AICPA 2005).
As displayed in Figure 2, the timing of an auditor affiliation can occur in one of
three ways (Lennox 2005). This study focuses on employment affiliations (Panel B),
which arise when the client company hires a member of the recurring external audit team.
There are two reasons I focus on employment affiliations. First, they are the most
common (Lennox 2005). Second, they are particularly susceptible to bias because the
auditor goes directly from being a member of the audit team to being an audit client. This
change in circumstance could alter the ex-auditor’s motivations, and potentially, his or
her objectivity.
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Figure 2
Auditor Affiliations
(Lennox 2005, 212)
Panel A: The timing of chance affiliations

Individual leaves
audit firm

Company selects
audit firm

Individual joins
client company

Panel B: The timing of employment affiliations

Company selects
audit firm

Individual leaves
audit firm

Individual joins
client company

Panel C: The timing of alma mater affiliations

Individual leaves
audit firm

Individual joins
client company

Company selects
audit firm

It is common for clients to hire employees from their current audit firm. In fact,
the relationship between audit firm and client has been referred to as a “revolving door”
(Bleed 2002, 1). Three benefits accrue from hiring former external auditors (Beasley et
al. 2000). First, auditors are often highly trained by their firms. Second, auditors
commonly have had exposure to varied clients, businesses, and complex financial
transactions. Third, a client company’s former auditors have an insider’s knowledge of
the client’s current strategies and corporate environment and therefore can quickly
acclimate themselves to client practices.
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Beasley et al. (2000) also identify three threats to the financial reporting process
associated with such hirings. While one of these threats relates to the potential for auditor
shirking before hiring, two relate to the time period after the auditor is hired. The first
threat, detailed previously in Section 2.2.4, relates to the client’s advantage over the
auditor. The ex-auditor’s intimate knowledge of the audit firm’s plans and procedures
logically makes it easier for him or her to successfully hide improprieties in the financial
statements from the current auditors. The second threat and the focus of this study, stems
from the effect of an in-group bias, explained later in Section 2.4.2, which causes the
auditor to overestimate the client’s objectivity, leading to underauditing. This bias can
cause a reluctance of the current auditors to question the assertions of clients who were
once their co-workers.
Although auditor affiliation threats have attracted the interest of regulators,
researchers have published little on the subject. Lennox (2004, 202) observes that “…no
published archival evidence exists on the types of affiliations or whether affiliations
impair audit quality.” Using an estimation model to identify companies whose
unfavorable opinion probabilities are greater than 10%, Lennox partitions these
companies based on the presence or absence of an affiliated executive. Findings suggest
that firms with affiliated executives were statistically more likely to have a clean audit
opinion. Menon and Williams (2004) examined cases where the affiliated client was a
former audit firm partner. Using an archival approach, after controlling for performance
characteristics, they found evidence of an affiliation effect. Firms employing former audit
partners were more likely to have larger abnormal accruals. In addition, they noted an
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affiliation effect on earnings such that firms with former affiliated partners were more
likely to just meet analysts’ earnings forecasts than were firms without former affiliated
partners. While the above studies examine correlations between affiliation and external
measured variables, the current study uses an experimental approach to explore the effect
of staff and senior auditor affiliation on individual audit judgments.
2.4 Auditing Judgment: Biases and Social Identity Theory
2.4.1 Biases in Auditing Judgments
Much has been written regarding the process, and particularly the weakness of
human judgment and decision-making (Bamber et al. 1995; Hogarth 1980; Kahneman et
al. 1982; Libby 1991). One such weakness is bias, defined as “a preference or an
inclination, especially one that inhibits impartial judgment” (American Heritage 2000).
Biases can be strategic (individuals are conscious of their bias) or implicit (individuals
are unaware of their bias). Auditors’ professional skepticism likely prevents them from
exhibiting strategic biases; however, implicit biases may persist.4 Bias identification is
particularly important in auditing since auditors are required to make many judgments,
the results of which can significantly impact multiple stakeholders. For example, if an
auditor incorrectly believes there is sufficient evidence to support an account balance
(overweighting), he could wrongly curtail further testing on that account. While a single
judgment error is not likely to increase risk considerably, the final audit opinion is the

4

For a discussion of the two types of biases, see Kunda (1990).
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sum of multiple judgments; therefore, the cumulative effect of these errors could
significantly increase the risk of an audit failure (Moeckel and Plumlee 1989).
Some frequently researched biases in the audit literature include: anchoring and
adjustment (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), primacy/recency effects (Kahneman et al.
1982), base rate frequency (Tuttle 1996), common information-sampling bias (O'Donnell
et al. 2000), and information search strategy (Kida 1984). The roots of these biases reside
in the psychology field. However, Bamber et al. (1995) suggest that auditing has unique
attributes that prevent the blanket application of psychology findings to auditors. Indeed,
research results are mixed. While auditors performed better than non-auditors in a
representativeness judgment (Joyce and Biddle 1981), and demonstrated a better
understanding of subpopulation error rates (Tuttle 1996), in anchoring and adjustment
studies they exhibited a recency effect consistent with general psychology findings
(Bamber et al. 1995). Although auditors are professionals, trained to detect errors and
misstatements, they are still human, and as such, demonstrate many of the biases long
established through years of psychology research.
2.4.2 Social Identity Theory
In-group bias, based on Social Identity Theory, influences human decisionmaking in social contexts (Tajfel 1981). This theory proposes that group members are an
extension of the self, and as such, each group member has a “…systematic tendency to
evaluate…(his)… own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably
than a nonmembership group (the out-group) or its members” (Hewstone et al. 2002,
576). In-group bias, characterized by one’s unquestioning belief in the assertions of a
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fellow group member, provides an individual with a positive social identity, thereby
satisfying his need for self-esteem (Hewstone et al. 2002). This bias is quite robust.
Oakes et al. (1994) note that discriminatory behavior and attitudes can be brought about
by a mere cognitive division of people into groups. Towry (2003) successfully
manipulated team identity simply through the use of colored props and seating
assignments.
Auditors become part of an audit firm’s in-group when they are hired. As they
work together on the same audit team, they develop familiarity through repeated
interactions, increasing the level of in-group bonding. Although auditors who eventually
leave the firm to go work for a client are technically no longer members of the audit
team, this change in employment does not necessarily exclude them from the audit ingroup. Levine et al. (1998) notes that individuals may simultaneously be members of
multiple groups. When an auditor becomes a client, the remaining audit team members
may view the ex-auditor as part of both the client and the audit groups. Therefore, even
after auditors go to work for a client, remaining audit team members could continue to
identify them as group members; they are, in fact, still working together on the same
audit, albeit on opposite sides.
2.4.3 Inter-group Bias in Social Psychology
According to Apfelbaum and Lubek (1979), three characteristics define intergroup bias. First, in-group members view themselves as a homogeneous group; second,
in-group members view out-group members as a homogeneous group; and third, in-group
members view themselves as different from out-group members. Inter-group bias causes
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people to draw distinctions based on group membership, rather than on individual traits.
Inter-group bias can take the form of in-group trust or out-group derogation. In-group
favoritism results in the “extension of trust, positive regard, cooperation, and empathy to
in-group, but not out-group members” (Hewstone et al. 2002, 578). Out-group derogation
is the underlying source of stereotyping and discrimination. Interestingly, much of the
psychology research seeks to reduce out-group derogation, and, in turn, reduce the intergroup conflict (Hewstone et al. 2002; Tajfel 1981). In this study, the focus lies not with
unwarranted out-group skepticism, but with unjustified in-group trust. The danger comes
from overweighting assertions made by an in-group member, not from underweighting
assertions made by an out-group member.
Self and social identity theories are often used to explain an individual’s behavior
in groups (Ellemers et al. 2002; Oakes et al. 1994; Tajfel 1981). Ellemers et al. (2002)
presents a taxonomy of the primary concerns and motives of the social self. The two axes
are level of group commitment (high and low) and level of perceived threat (none,
individual, and group). The taxonomy in Figure 3 details concerns and motives for each
response. For the purposes of this study, I classify auditors with a rank of senior and
below auditors as belonging to Cell #4: high commitment to the group and exposure to
individual-directed threats. While there is no prior research to directly support this
classification, these auditors are likely to be highly committed to their firm; seniors have
chosen to stay with their firms by accepting promotions and have been given additional
responsibilities within the firm, and staff members have just completed years of training
and study, as well as a competitive interview process. The individual threat is one of
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exclusion from the group (e.g., being fired). These auditors are more likely to make
decisions that further their acceptance as part of the group than decisions that might lead
to their rejection by the group.
Figure 3
Primary concerns and motives of the social self: a taxonomy
(Ellemers et al. 2002, 167)

No threat
Concern:
Motive:
Individual-directed threat
Concern:
Motive:
Group-directed threat
Concern:
Motive:

Group Commitment
Low
High
1.
2.
Accuracy/efficiency
Social meaning
Noninvolvement
Identity expression
3.
4.
Categorization
Exclusion
Self-affirmation
Acceptance
5.
6.
Value
Distinctiveness, value
Individual mobility
Group-affirmation

Ellemers et al. (2002, 173) points out that new group members “…tend to be more
anxious and lack confidence reflecting acceptance concerns….” I surmise that this lack of
confidence could negatively affect an auditor’s professional skepticism, causing him to
be reluctant to question affiliated clients, an idea echoed by Beasley et al. (2000).
Within a single organization, there are both in-group and out-group members.
Napier and Ferris (1993) note that, among other factors, the higher the perceived
similarity between supervisors and subordinates, the lower the psychological distance. In
turn, “…less Psychological Distance is associated with greater attraction and liking,
greater subordinate satisfaction, and higher supervisor evaluations of subordinate
performance” (Napier and Ferris 1993, 333). Given these benefits, it is likely that staff
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and senior auditors would seek to nurture perceived similarity between themselves and
their superiors, including the former auditor who is now a client.
2.4.4 In-group Bias in Auditing
An extensive literature search revealed only one behavioral study on the effects of
in-group bias among auditors. King (2002) challenged the idea that auditors are
subservient to self-serving biases, and that they are unable to objectively audit a client
upon whose business they depend. In an experiment, he created a strong group identity
among the auditors by having them meet frequently with each other. This strong identity
resulted in the auditors’ increased ability to detect client deceptions. Auditors in the weak
group treatment interacted primarily with clients and were less likely to detect client
deception. The team identity in the strong group “…motivates auditors to focus more on
the collective goal of conducting appropriate audits” (King 2002, 267). The result was
that this motivation overcame the auditor’s self-serving biases.5
In the above study, auditors’ in-group bias toward other auditors resulted in better
audits yet individuals belong to many groups simultaneously, resulting in differing
degrees of group identity (Ellemers et al. 2002). I might identify myself as a graduate of a
particular university, an accountant, an auditor, an employee of a large audit firm, and
specifically, an employee of a particular firm. Depending on how strongly I identify with
each group, I will exhibit a concomitant level of in-group bias. In an auditor/client
relationship, auditors may view clients as fellow group members based on their common

5

A self-serving bias in this case is defined as the auditor’s need to please the client so that the client will
continue to contract with the auditor for services.
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socio-economic class, college alma mater, religious affiliation, or, where the client was
once an auditor. In the case of employment affiliation, the auditor could still view the exauditor, now the client, as an audit firm group member.
In-group bias is particularly relevant in auditing because it can affect the auditor’s
professional skepticism. For example, analytical procedures often require auditors to
gather and evaluate explanations from clients. A key part of this evaluation involves the
auditor’s ability to judge the client’s objectivity correctly, and the effect that objectivity
has on the client’s truthfulness. In the context of the current study, clients were also once
fellow auditors, thus confounding group identity. A likely outcome is that auditors will
continue to identify affiliated clients with their former audit group and thus will fail to
adjust their assessment of the client’s objectivity appropriately. The resulting
unwarranted trust could cause the auditor to accept the client’s implausible explanation,
resulting in an incorrect audit judgment.
2.4.5 A Normative View
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards require auditors to approach an audit
engagement with professional skepticism; the notion that a seemingly irrelevant past
association could result in unjustified bias is a cause for concern. It is important to
investigate whether this past relationship is truly irrelevant.
Hirst (1994) suggests that both competence and objectivity should be considered
in a source reliability judgment. Based on an insider’s knowledge of hiring criteria,
professional certifications, firm training and evaluation procedures, along with the direct
experience of working together, auditors should correctly assess their former co-worker’s

22

competence. The validity of this assessment should not change regardless of the fellow
co-worker’s employment. Auditors must also assess a client’s objectivity -- an
individual’s motivation to communicate his beliefs honestly. In fulfilling their obligation
to reduce the risk that accompanies the principal-agent relationship characteristic of
owners and managers, auditors must maintain objectivity. Auditor objectivity arises from
the motivation to provide a quality audit. Contrary to this, client bias arises from the
motivation to present the financial statements in the best possible light. Because of this
difference in motivations, it is likely that a client’s representations are more biased (less
objective) than those of an auditor.
2.5 Statement of Hypotheses – In-group Bias
The first part of this study tests whether staff and senior auditors demonstrate ingroup bias when assessing a client-provided explanation. As noted earlier, senior
auditors’ experience should enable them to detect an implausible explanation. However,
senior auditors’ tenure with the firm should lead to a strong in-group association. Staff
auditors, although less experienced, have a need for acceptance by the group and are
likely to align themselves with established group members. Staff members could either
seek to impress the audit team by demonstrating skepticism of client explanations or
could view the client as part of the audit firm in-group and thus be reluctant to question
the assertions. In sum, both levels have the potential to exhibit in-group bias. Given that
arguments exist for and against in-group bias at each level, I make no formal hypotheses
about level. Rather I make a general proposal that in-group bias persists from the original
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association between the client and auditor, making the auditor more likely to overrate the
plausibility of a client explanation.
The following hypothesis tests for a simple effect of in-group bias.
H1: Given an implausible explanation, auditors will judge that
explanation as more plausible when it comes from an in-group
client, than when it comes from an out-group client.
Auditors also must express confidence in their judgments. Rose (2002, 114) notes
that individuals may exhibit either overconfidence (“…increases in confidence without
the associated improvements in decision quality…”), or underconfidence (failure of the
individual to recognize when the decision is accurate). General psychology research finds
overwhelmingly that individuals are overconfident (Fischoff 1982). In the audit literature,
findings on confidence are mixed (Ahlawat 1999; Bamber and Ramsay 2000; Einhorn
and Hogarth 1978; Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). Tomassini et al. (1982) find that auditors
demonstrate less overconfidence than suggested by the general psychology literature for
an audit-related task. Solomon et al. (1982) find that auditors were underconfident in an
audit task; however, similar to general psychology findings, were overconfident in a
general knowledge task. In an audit evidence recall task, Moeckel and Plumlee (1989)
find that participants are equally confident in their inaccurate memories as in their
accurate memories. Bamber (1995) suggests that there is some underlying, unknown
reason for underconfidence in an audit context.
Given that auditors would not expect an in-group client to present an implausible
explanation, they may question their own judgment, causing their confidence to be lower
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than it would be if the implausible explanation came from an out-group client. This
discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Given an implausible explanation, auditors will be less
confident in their initial plausibility judgment when the
explanation comes from an in-group client than when it comes
from an out-group client.
Auditors rely on their judgments to adjust future audit plans (Cohen and Kida
1989). It is important to evaluate whether in-group bias has an effect on auditors’
decisions to extend or curtail further testing. Auditors who correctly identify an
explanation as implausible could still suspend testing on that item because a fellow group
member supplied the explanation. To explain further, an auditor could believe that a
client explanation is implausible, but not believe that the client is intentionally lying. An
auditor who has an in-group relationship with the client could still choose to extend
testing; however, this extension of testing could be less than if the auditor did not have an
in-group relationship with the client. In-group bias could result in an auditor deciding to
give a fellow group member “the benefit of the doubt.” On the other hand, an auditor who
receives an implausible explanation from an in-group client could believe that the client
is intentionally lying and compensate for this discovered deception by increasing testing.
I propose that consistent with in-group bias, an auditor will extend testing by less when
the client is an in-group member than when the client is an out-group member.6
H3: Given an implausible explanation, auditors who correctly
identify an explanation as implausible will extend testing less
when the client is an in- group member than when the client is
an out-group member.
6

This hypothesis refers to decisions without benefit of a decision aid; however, auditors may reassess their
decision after using a decision aid. I test this hypothesis pre and post-decision aid.
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2.6 Discussion of Potential Covariates
I consider the following potential covariates for inclusion in the model: perception
of client competence, prior task experience, and prior experience with affiliated clients.7
Hirst (1994) finds that competence and objectivity interact in an auditor’s determination
of source reliability. To control for this possible interaction, I measure each participant’s
perceived client competence rating. I plan to compare these ratings across groups to rule
out a competence effect on auditor judgments, confidence, and decisions.
Prior research finds that task experience is positively related to performance on
audit tasks in general, as well as on analytical procedures (Hirst and Koonce 1996;
Kaplan et al. 1992; Libby and Frederick 1990). Thus, auditors who are experienced in
analytical procedures are likely to give lower plausibility judgments than are auditors
with less experience. Given that the sample includes auditors from staff through senior
levels, it is reasonable to assume that participants have varying levels of experience with
procedures. Therefore, I include a measure of analytical procedures experience as a
potential covariate in the model.
An auditor’s prior experience with affiliated clients could impact their attention to
the group manipulation, and as a result, affect their judgment. For example, an auditor
who has no prior experience working with an affiliated client could interpret the in-group
manipulation as unusual. This interpretation could lead him or her to weight the in-group
factor more than an auditor who had prior experience with affiliated clients. Accordingly,

7

All covariates are measured post-task to avoid confounds within the research design.
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I ask for participants’ prior experience working with affiliated clients for inclusion in the
model as a potential covariate.
If auditors exhibit in-group bias, and this bias potentially increases audit risk, it is
valuable to examine whether there is a tool to mitigate this bias effectively and
efficiently. In sections 2.7 – 2.10, I develop an argument that a valid, objective decision
aid will be successful in mitigating in-group bias.
2.7 Debiasing In Auditing
Multiple techniques exist for debiasing in an audit environment. Justification
(Peecher 1996), counterexplanation (Kennedy 1995), accountability (Kennedy 1993;
Tetlock 1983), documentation (Ballou 2001) and the review process (Brazel et al. 2004;
Trotman 1985) all influence the auditor’s judgment and performance on audit tasks.
Although research has shown the prior methods to be effective, there are three
noteworthy drawbacks to using them. First, since the cost of an audit depends on the
number of hours worked, efficiency is of key importance. The review process, while
effective, takes both the auditor’s and the reviewer’s time. Second, review and
documentation procedures are detective or corrective controls -- they do not prevent staff
members from making initial errors in judgment. Third, because individuals implement
these methods, execution could be inconsistent, resulting in more audit risk.
Decision aids are not subject to the above drawbacks. Abdolmohammadi and
Usoff (2001) find that practitioners identify a multitude of audit tasks that are well-suited
to the use of decision aids. Rose (2002) notes that decision aids can mitigate systematic
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information-processing biases.8 By their nature, they offer a consistent, objective
recommendation to the auditor (Ashton 1992). This consistency reduces variability in
both an individual auditor’s judgments, as well as auditors’ judgments firm-wide.
Although decision aids do not completely prevent incorrect judgments, they can provide
auditors with suggestions and direction.
2.8 Debiasing and Improving Judgment and Decisions with Decision Aids
Several studies establish the effectiveness of decision aids in mitigating audit
judgment biases and improving audit judgments overall (Butler 1985; Eining et al. 1997;
Emby and Finley 1997; Rose and Rose 2003). Butler (1985) developed a decision aid that
focused the user’s attention away from specifics and to a broader view of the situation.
Since analytical procedures require auditors to consider the interrelationships among
accounts, a decision aid that informs the user about these interrelationships should
improve judgments. Eining et al. (1997) find that for a complex task (fraud detection) an
expert system with a constructive dialogue feature is effective in improving judgments.
The authors considered a combination of characteristics from the psychology literature to
design a constructive dialogue feature that would increase decision aid reliance. Increased
reliance led not only to improved assessments, but also to improved decisions. Emby and
Finley (1997) successfully used an evidence rating technique to mitigate framing effects
for internal control assessments and decisions.

8

Decision aids can create new judgment biases, especially in the presence of other debiasing strategies
such as accountability and incentives (Ashton 1990). For a discussion of the literature on decision aids, see
Rose (2002).
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Decision aids can effectively mitigate biases in auditing. Kennedy’s (1993; 1995)
framework classifies biases as either “data-related” or “effort-related.” Effort-related
biases occur when the decision-maker has either insufficient capacity or insufficient
motivation to complete the task. Suggested solutions include increasing internal capacity,
providing incentives, or introducing accountability. Data-related biases occur when either
internal or external information (or both) are imprecise. Internal data (individual
memory) is the source for individual biases such as framing (Emby and Finley 1997),
first impression bias (Lim et al. 2000), and anchoring and adjustment (George et al.
2000). External data biases arise when the information provided to the individual is
unclear, irrelevant, or presented in complex format. In the current study, I classify ingroup bias as an internal data bias because the in-group influence arises from the
individual’s biased perception of the affiliated client’s trustworthiness.
Both Kennedy (1995) and Roy and Lerch (1996) suggest the following solutions
to minimize data-related bias. First, firms can modify information presentation. This
approach is used successfully by Lim et al. (2000) to reduce reinterpretation of secondary
data (a framing bias) and present the secondary data in such a way that it could not be
ignored. Second, firms can train individuals to use appropriate information processing
strategies. Firms can provide feedback during a task so that individuals can adjust their
decision processes and subsequently apply the improved process to similar situations.
Eining et al. (1997) uses this approach in designing a decision aid that includes
constructive dialogue. Third, firms can replace decision-makers with a model that
suggests a normative answer. Libby and Libby (1989) find less variability and better
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performance when auditors used a decision aid to combine multiple judgments into a
global answer. Rose and Rose (2003) also find that decision aids mitigated recency bias
in an audit evidence evaluation task.
In this study, in-group bias involves a subconscious leaning toward believing an
in-group member. The debiasing agent will display information in a structured format, as
well as provide cues to guide the auditor in his search for support. I discuss the decision
aid design in Section 3.5.2.
2.9 Decision Aid Reliance in Auditing
Technology use is increasing in today’s audit process. A longitudinal survey of
auditors indicates an increase in the number of audit tasks that are amenable to the
application of a decision aid (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001). Audit firms use a
variety of decision aids, decision support systems, and expert systems in the audit process
(Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001; Bedard and Graham 2002). Relevant decision aid
studies find that reliance is influenced by face validity (Ashton 1990), and source
objectivity (Anderson et al. 2003; Lim et al. 2000). A decision aid’s face validity refers to
the users’ assessment of “the extent to which it appears sensible and reasonable” (Ashton
1990, 170). Source objectivity refers to the trustworthiness of the decision aid’s source.
Ye and Johnson (1995) find that auditors are more likely to accept expert system
advice if the advice is reasonable. In addition, the study finds that justification, described
as “…an explicit description of the causal argument or rationale behind each inferential
step taken by the ES” is most effective in user acceptance of expert systems (Ye and
Johnson 1995, 158). Justification requires auditors to have a deep understanding of
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accounting; in this study, auditors must be familiar with the relationships among
accounts, in order to judge the decision aid predictions as reasonable. Ye and Johnson
(1995) posit that decision aid reasonableness increases the auditor’s confidence in the aid,
and thus increases the probability that the auditor will rely on the aid. As noted above,
Eining et al. (1997) successfully increase decision aid reliance by incorporating a
constructive dialogue feature in their decision aid. However, there is ample evidence in
the literature that decision makers do not always rely on decision aids (Rose 2002).
Individuals may work around the decision aid (Kachelmeier and Messier 1990) or try to
outperform the decision aid (Arkes et al. 1986). Thus, there is a possibility that auditors
will not rely on a decision aid.
Anderson et al. (2003) find that auditors judged decision aid explanations as more
sufficient than client-provided explanations, when, in fact, such explanations were
insufficient. Overreliance on the decision aid resulted from the auditor’s assessment of
the decision aid’s objectivity. Since validity and objectivity are both important to
decision aid reliance, I will confirm that participants judged the decision aid in the study
to be both valid and objective.
2.10 Statement of Hypotheses – Decision Improvement
Auditor judgments can be influenced by in-group bias, as posited above.
However, factors other than group biases can also negatively impact auditor judgments.
For example, even auditors who receive an implausible explanation from a non-affiliated
client can incorrectly accept the explanation as plausible. This error in judgment can arise
from the auditor’s reliance on perceived client competence. In other words, an auditor
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can successfully complete step one of the plausibility check (plausibility of hypothesis
given the change in account balance), yet fail to complete step two (plausibility of the
hypothesis given other, external information) successfully. A decision aid that redirects
the auditor’s attention to other possible hypotheses (similar to the approaches of Lim et
al. (2000) and Butler (1985)) should improve auditor judgments. Further, a decision aid
that provides reasonable justification (as found by Ye and Johnson (1995)) should result
in auditor reliance, which is necessary for audit judgment improvement. I propose that a
decision aid will improve auditor judgment by directing auditors’ attention to the
implausibility of the client-provided explanation. The decision aid will provide more
information, lowering cognitive effort, as suggested by Kennedy (1993). Finally, auditors
should judge a firm-developed decision aid as more valid and objective, causing them to
weight the decision aid’s recommendation more than the client’s explanation, as
evidenced in Anderson et al. (2003).
Hypothesis 4 tests the effectiveness of decision aid use on auditors who initially
incorrectly judge plausibility to be high.
H4: Given an implausible explanation, auditors who make an
initial incorrect judgment will decrease their plausibility
judgment after using a decision aid.
Ahlawat (1999) finds that confidence increases with an increase in the amount of
information provided. The decision aid report provides additional information to the
auditor by directing his or her attention to alternative explanations and expected
relationships among relevant accounts. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) provide a model for
belief adjustment that addresses how beliefs change when new information is received.
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Srivastava and Mock (2004) suggest that an auditor’s belief assessment regarding audit
evidence includes three components: first, the belief that the evidence supports the
conclusion, second, the belief that it supports an opposing conclusion, and third, the
ambiguity related to unknown information. As auditors gather new information the
amount of ambiguity decreases and they can classify information as confirming or
disconfirming. As ambiguity about the judgment decreases, auditors should feel more
certain about their decisions. Ye and Johnson (1995) suggest that the use and acceptance
of decision aid recommendations will improve user confidence. Chung and Monroe
(2000) find that judgment confidence decreases as perceived task difficulty increases.
Use of a decision aid should reduce cognitive effort and therefore reduce task difficulty.
As task difficulty decreases, I expect confidence to increase. In this study, the decision
aid offers feedback by providing expected relationships between relevant accounts.
Auditors who have the requisite accounting knowledge and rely on the decision aid
should recognize whether their prior judgment was correct. If they were initially
incorrect, this realization should lead them to the correct answer, about which they should
be confident. If they were initially correct, reliance on the decision aid reinforces their
original answer and should also increase confidence. I propose the following hypothesis.
H5: Auditors will be more confident in their post-decision aid
plausibility judgment than in their pre-decision aid plausibility
judgment.
Finally, I explore the effect of decision aid reliance on auditor decisions to extend
testing. Based on the reasoning used for Hypothesis 4, a logical result of the change in
plausibility judgment is a change in extent of testing. Auditors who rely on the decision
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aid, and subsequently change their judgment of the client explanation from plausible to
implausible, should logically adjust their extent of testing to reflect their revised belief.
Eining et al. (1997) noted that not only did auditors improve their judgments after using a
decision aid, but they also improved their subsequent decisions. Bukszar (2003) finds that
individuals treat decisions with more consideration than they do judgments.9 In a forecast
and investment task, he finds that individuals perform an additional evaluation step
between making a judgment and making a decision, which results in individuals being
likely to act on their accurate judgments. In an audit context, it is important to explore the
effect of a decision aid not only on judgments, but on subsequent decisions.
Auditors who initially judge a client explanation plausible, will likely extend
testing little, if at all. Post decision-aid, auditors who reevaluate their decision and
conclude that the client explanation is implausible, will likely increase testing. Further, an
auditor who changes his or her plausibility judgment to implausible will also likely
reassess the client’s objectivity, also leading to a decision to increase testing. Therefore,
I propose the following hypothesis.
H6: Given an implausible explanation, auditors who make an
initial incorrect judgment will increase their extent of testing
after using a decision aid.

9

A judgment is an individual’s inference about an external event or phenomenon. A decision is an
individual’s choice of action (Hastie 2001).
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
3.1 Introduction
This section details the experimental method. I first justify the sample selection,
noting that seniors and staff members both have the potential to exhibit in-group bias for
different reasons. Then I discuss the choice and design of analytical procedures as the
experimental task. Analytical review of expenses is an appropriate task for staff and
senior auditors and it is amenable to decision aid development (Abdolmohammadi 1999).
I proceed to discuss the research design, detailing the procedure, instrument
development, and measurement of dependent variables. I include a discussion of the
client explanation, noting that the explanation is reasonable given the related change in
account balance, but implausible given the change in related accounts. I describe the
establishment of the between-subjects manipulation - group affiliation, and the creation
of the within-subjects treatment – decision aid. I describe the dependent variable scales,
noting their use by prior researchers in the audit literature.
Finally, I include a discussion of threats to internal and external validity, noting
how this study addresses those threats. I follow with a discussion of manipulation checks.
I also describe the pilot study. Finally, I detail planned statistical analyses.
3.2 Sample
Participants are staff and senior auditors. I chose staff auditors because, as noted,
clients will likely use their inside knowledge to deceive less-experienced (novice)
auditors. Further, analytical procedures are often completed by assistant auditors
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(Abdolmohammadi 1999). I chose senior auditors to explore whether in-group bias
affects multiple levels within the firm. Seniors, because of their experience, should
accurately detect implausible explanations. However, their longer affiliation with the firm
may increase their in-group bias. The use of auditors (as opposed to audit students) is
necessary to establish the in-group treatment. Auditors have had time to develop in-group
feelings toward their co-workers, and should also have sufficient task experience.
Online access to the experimental materials simplified data collection from
various locations. I recruited participants from several national CPA firms. All
participation was voluntary; I contacted firms and asked them to distribute the web link to
their staff through senior auditors, along with a letter endorsing the study. I provided no
incentives for performance; however, participants were asked to voluntarily provide
contact information if they wanted individual feedback. To encourage completion, I
allowed participants to direct a $5.00 donation to their choice of charity (from a select
list).
3.3 Experimental Task
The experimental task required an auditor to perform an analytical procedure on
the repair and maintenance expense account during the substantive testing phase of the
audit. There are three reasons for this choice of task: it is appropriate for staff through
senior auditors, expense accounts have been used to hide fraud (high inherent risk), and
the analytical procedure related to expenses is amenable to decision aid use. First,
auditors identify this task as appropriate for a staff auditor to conduct (Abdolmohammadi
1999). Second, asset misappropriation often occurs in expense accounts (Hall 2004).
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Third, analysis of repair and maintenance expense is a substantive testing task that is
amenable to the development of decision support systems (Abdolmohammadi 1999).
Analytical procedures are a semi-structured task; they include a reasonably well-defined
problem, with limited alternatives, requiring some judgment (Abdolmohammadi 1991).
Although a decision aid can list plausible reasons for an account balance fluctuation,
auditors must also consider many intangible, non-financial factors that cannot or typically
are not covered by a decision aid. Auditors must use their judgment to make a final
determination regarding the likelihood that a given explanation is plausible.
Task materials included a narrative description of the firm, a copy of the current
and prior year’s financial statements (with the unexpected increase in the repair and
maintenance expense account highlighted), a description of the client’s background (to
establish the varying group treatments), and the client’s explanation for the unexpected
fluctuation.10 After the first measurements, participants had access to a decision aid.11
3.4 Research Design
3.4.1 Procedure
Figure 4 details the mixed research design with one between-subjects factor
(group affiliation) and one within-subjects factor (decision aid). Prior to completing the
task, participants filled out an online informed consent, as well as a demographic
questionnaire to elicit the identity of their current employer, as well as their level in the
10

Overstatement of expenses is often an indication of asset misappropriation; a fraud which is more likely
to be committed by mid to lower management (Hall 2004), such as a controller or assistant controller.
11
The decision aid was labeled as “firm developed”, but was developed by the author and was the same
decision aid for all participants.
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firm (staff or senior).12 It was necessary to gather this information before the experiment
to operationalize the group manipulation. I randomly assigned participants to either an ingroup or an out-group treatment (the difference between in-group and out-group was the
client representative’s history). For in-group participants, the client was a former
employee of the participants’ audit firm, for out-group members, the client was a longtime employee of the client firm.

Experimental Condition

Figure 4
Diagram of the Experimental Design
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All participants then had access to the above-referenced task materials. They
made the following judgments: plausibility of the client’s explanation (scale of 0 – 100),
their confidence in that judgment (scale of 0 – 100), and whether and how much to
extend testing on that item (number of hours). After making those judgments, participants
were shown a decision aid report (attributed to their firm’s national office research
department), as well as to the materials provided earlier. They then answered the same

12

Demographics also include age, gender, certifications held, and highest education level.
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questions regarding plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing. A post-test
questionnaire included manipulation checks and further measures that may be significant,
including the participants’ perceptions of client competence, prior analytical procedures
experience, and experience with affiliated clients. At the conclusion of the online
experiment, participants were thanked for their participation and were allowed to direct a
contribution to a charity of their choosing.
3.4.2 Characterization of Client Explanation
There are two steps to the plausibility check (see Figure 1). Step one relates to
how well the explanation fits with the unexpected fluctuation. This judgment is a test of
accounting knowledge (Libby 1985). The auditor need only do a search of his internal
knowledge base to judge the explanation’s plausibility. It is also unlikely that a client,
especially a competent client, would present an explanation that violates the accounting
relationships. Therefore, I use a client-provided explanation that is plausible, given an
increase in the repair and maintenance account.13
The second step requires the auditor to confirm that the explanation fits the
circumstances. The auditor must search for information to confirm or disconfirm the
client’s explanation. To judge implausibility, the auditor conducts an external information
search, rather than an internal accounting knowledge search. This search requires
additional effort. In a situation where in-group bias exists, the auditor could

13

A manipulation check confirmed that the participant has sufficient accounting knowledge to identify the
explanation as plausible, given the fluctuation.
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subconsciously choose to forego the additional work and rely instead on his positive
assessment of the client’s source objectivity.
In the experimental task, the client explanation is consistent with the direction of
the unexpected fluctuation, yet inconsistent with certain financial statement information
(fixed assets have increased). The client explanation provided to participants follows:
The unexpected increase in repair and maintenance expense
comes from an internal decision to forego replacing certain
capital equipment until next year. We were planning to
replace our fleet of trucks with a new fleet, but due to the
increase in interest rates, we decided to repair, rather than
replace them.
3.5 Independent Variables
3.5.1 Between-subjects treatment: Group Affiliation
I manipulate group affiliation at two levels between subjects. Although
individuals concurrently claim various group affiliations, in this study, I vary only the
former employment of the client. In-group clients are either former managers or seniors
from the recurring audit team.14 Out-group clients have worked only for the client firm. I
expect the manipulation to affect the auditor’s judgment of the client’s objectivity.
However, since source reliability includes both competence and objectivity, I hold
competence constant between treatment groups.
Manipulations occur after this brief introduction.

14

Senior auditors received an explanation from a former audit team manager who became a controller for
the client. Staff auditors received an explanation from a former audit team senior who became an assistant
controller for the client. This design maintains one level between the auditor and his or her superior.
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As part of the current audit fieldwork, your assignment is to
evaluate the changes in expense accounts. Noticing that the
current year's repair and maintenance expense account
balance is unexpectedly high, you have asked Chris, the
controller, to provide an explanation.
In group
Chris's Background

Out group
Chris's Background

Chris worked for (your firm)
for the last several years,
where he was a manager
(senior) on the Continental
Transport audit.

Chris has worked for
Continental Transport for
the last several years

He recently took a job at
Continental as the controller
(assistant controller).

He was recently promoted
to Controller (Assistant
Controller) at Continental.

Chris is technically
proficient in accounting.

Chris is technically
proficient in accounting.

3.5.2 Within-subjects treatment: Decision Aid
I propose that the decision aid will mitigate in-group bias by modifying the
presentation of information and providing the auditor search cues. Based on the client’s
financial statements, the decision aid report lists possible explanations for the unexpected
account fluctuation. I establish decision aid validity and objectivity as follows.
The following report was generated by “DecisionSERVE”
audit software, developed by the (your firm’s) national
office research department. Auditors should use it to assist
them in evaluating client explanations. The process uses the
client’s current and past year’s financial data to generate
possible explanations for changes in account balances.
Past experience indicates that DecisionSERVE provides
valid explanations.
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See Appendix A for an example of the decision aid output and the financial statements.
3.6 Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables are measured both pre- and post-decision aid—
plausibility, confidence, and extension of testing.
3.6.1 Plausibility
Prior source reliability studies (Bamber 1983; Hirst 1994), used a 100-point scale
to evaluate participants’ judgments. Bamber (1983) asked participants to evaluate the
sufficiency of an internal control system. End points were “No Likelihood” and “Certain
Likelihood.” Hirst (1994) asked participants to provide a probability estimate that
inventory was materially misstated. On a 100-point scale, endpoints were “there is
absolutely no chance that Inventory is materially misstated” and “I am absolutely certain
that Inventory is materially misstated” (p.119). This study uses a 0-100 point scale: end
points are “not at all plausible” and “highly plausible”.
3.6.2 Confidence
Final audit opinions are the result of combining multiple audit judgments.
Confidence in each judgment should be sufficient to prevent an audit failure. Bamber et
al. (1995) reviews research on auditor confidence finding that auditors are overconfident
in their general knowledge, but underconfident in their performance of financial and audit
tasks. This underconfidence could be a result of conservatism. I measure confidence on a
0-100 point scale; end points are “not at all confident” and “completely confident.”
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3.6.3 Extension of Testing
The extent of testing variable measures the effect of in-group bias on auditor
decisions. I inform participants that a normal budget for expense testing for this type of
client and risk level is 40 hours. The measure allows for the participant to answer “0” if
they choose not to extend testing. Although staff auditors generally do not make
decisions to increase testing, they have leeway to investigate items further and/or make
recommendations to their superiors. Senior auditors do make decisions regarding
extension of testing therefore this measure mirrors practice. Following prior research
(Cohen and Kida 1989), I use number of hours budgeted to measure planned increases in
testing. The scale has end points of 0 hours and 10 hours.
3.7 Internal and External Validity
3.7.1 Internal Validity
Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991, 224) define internal validity as “…the validity of
assertions regarding the effects of the independent variable(s) on the dependent
variable(s).” In this study, I establish internal validity through a careful research design.
My goal is to eliminate alternative explanations so that any significant findings related to
judgments, confidence in those judgments and decisions to extend testing, are, in fact,
due to either the group manipulation or the use of a decision aid. Common threats to
internal validity include history, maturation, testing, instrumentation, regression to the
mean, selection bias, and mortality (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991).
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History threats relate to events that occur during or immediately preceding the
study, which could influence participants’ responses. In this study, legislation restricting
auditor hiring by clients was passed one year prior data collection. Since auditors would
likely be aware of this legislation, they could have been more attuned to the concept of
in-group bias toward affiliated clients. This awareness could have led participants to
guess the group hypothesis and as a result, overcompensate for the bias by reducing their
initial plausibility judgment.
Maturation occurs during studies that occur over time – allowing individual
personal changes to affect outcomes. Participants completed this study in a single sitting
over less than one hour’s time; therefore, maturation is not a significant threat.
The testing threat is applicable when individuals are measured multiple times
using the same variable (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). In this study, all three
dependent variables are measured twice (pre- and post-decision aid). To increase the
likelihood that individuals would give true responses to the post-decision aid questions, I
designed the survey so that prior answers were unavailable for viewing (participants
could not access prior survey pages). This design prevents auditors from merely repeating
their original answers. Instead, they should have been more likely to incorporate new
information (from the decision aid) into their second responses.
Instrumentation threats arise from differences in the instrument or differences in
the administration of the instrument. I used the same instrument for all participants,
however, since data collection occurred online, individual differences in browsers or
computing speed could have influenced participant responses. For example, although two
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individuals could have spent the same amount of time completing the survey, the
individual with a faster online connection speed could have spent more time reading the
background information and thinking about his answers before responding. The
participant with a slower online connection would have had to wait longer for the page to
load, thus shortening the time used to consider responses. Other than an analysis of “time
to complete” (I verified that no participant took less than 9 minutes or more than 60
minutes), the only other way to control this threat would have been to administer the
survey in a computer lab. Given the geographical disparity of participants, this option
was not feasible.
Regression to the mean occurs whenever two variables are not perfectly
correlated with each other (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). In this study, the threat of
regression to the mean is relevant to the second measurements of the dependent variables.
For example, regression to the mean predicts that auditors who initially rate plausibility
low (the correct answer), will increase their second plausibility rating toward the mean.
Likewise, auditors who initially rate plausibility high will decrease their second
plausibility ratings toward the mean. To test for this effect, I evaluate the direction of
change for both high and low initial plausibility ratings to assure that they do not assume
this pattern.
Random assignment to treatment groups minimizes the threat of selection bias.
However, the method of participant recruitment could lead to sample selection bias. I
recruited auditors by contacting each firm’s national or local office. Partners distributed
the survey site link through an internal e-mail. Bias could occur from the partners’
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selection of employees to send the e-mail to, or could occur from the employees who
chose to respond to the e-mail. A larger sample size would allow me to confirm that there
is no difference between early or late responders with respect to demographics and
dependent variable measures. However, the small sample size prevents a thorough
analysis of non-response bias.
Mortality occurs when individuals do not complete the entire survey. Given that
this experiment was voluntary, individuals were free to drop at any time. In addition,
since the survey was online, there was little cost to dropping out (participants would just
close their browser). Further, mortality in an online context could be unintentional (e.g.,
technology breakdowns, lost Internet connections). During the data collection period, two
audit firms distributed links to the survey immediately preceding the Thanksgiving
holiday. The following Monday is referred to as “Black Monday” because of the
increased online shopping traffic (Kopytoff 2005). Auditors who attempted to logon to
the Internet could have experienced slower connections due to this phenomenon. This
could have influenced participants to drop out of the study prior to completion. When I
became aware of this threat, I contacted the two firms and requested that they send an email encouraging auditors to return to the survey if they had experienced Internet
slowdowns. I also designed the survey to allow participants to logon multiple times. This
allowed participants a chance to complete surveys that were unintentionally interrupted.
Using demographic analysis and IP address data, I confirmed all responses were from
different individuals.
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3.7.2 External Validity
External validity is a measure of how well findings can be generalized to or across
target populations, settings, or time (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). Participants, task,
and time are all limitations to external validity. I designed this study and collected data
from only staff and senior auditors at large, national audit firms. Application of findings
is limited to this population group. Because managers and partners have longer tenure
with their firms, as well as more advanced audit skills, generalization to levels above
senior auditor are inappropriate. In addition, this study makes use of a single audit task,
analytical procedures. Audit research indicates that task structure and complexity
influence outcomes and should be adequately considered (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff
2001). Care should be taken in extending findings to expectations of auditor behavior on
other audit tasks, especially tasks of different complexity. Finally, as noted before, data
collection occurred during a time of heightened awareness of possible biases related to
auditor affiliation. On a larger scale, given several large recent audit failures, audit
quality was also a concern during data collection. Generalization to future time periods
may be unsupported and should be approached with caution.
3.8 Manipulation Checks
The post-task questionnaire includes a series of manipulation checks to evaluate
the strength of the manipulation and rule out alternative explanations. It also contains
several questions related to prior audit experience and prior experience with clients who
are former audit firm employees.
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The first series of questions measures the participant’s judgment of client
competence and client and decision aid objectivity. Consistency of competence ratings
between group treatments rules out the possibility that perceived differences in client
competence influenced plausibility judgments.
Following Hirst (1994), I had the participants rate the client’s objectivity (defined
as …the likelihood that the client would give you, the auditor, a fictitious reason for an
account fluctuation, when, in fact, he knew that the real reason was different). End points
are “Extremely low” and “Extremely High”.
Finally, as in Anderson et al. (2003), participants rated the objectivity of the
decision aid. To rule out participant non-reliance on the decision aid due to a perception
of low validity, I also measured the participant’s perception of the decision aid’s validity.
The second set of questions elicits information about the participant’s past
experience and general opinions. Participants answered questions about their audit
experience, experience with clients who were former audit team members, and analytical
procedures experience. They also rated whether their firm alumnae are more or less
competent and/or objective than are alumnae of other audit firms, or non-firm
accountants.
3.9 Planned Statistical Analyses
The first step in data analysis, before hypothesis testing, is to evaluate responses
for adherence to the manipulation checks. In this study, I am testing for group bias on the
basis of auditor affiliation. I cannot assume that participants who fail the betweensubjects group manipulation adequately attended to the group affiliation factor; therefore,
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I plan to exclude those participants from the analysis. I will also evaluate how much time
each participant spent logged onto the survey. Based on pilot study findings (section
3.10), participants who spend less than eight minutes likely have not put forth the
minimum effort to complete the task, therefore, I will eliminate those responses from the
dataset.
I will then analyze the remaining data for violations of the statistical assumptions
of normality of the dependent variables and constant and equal variance of the residuals
using visual analysis of the stem and leaf plots and histograms and formal statistical tests
including the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality. I will use
Levene’s test for equality of variances.
If the data adhere to the required assumptions, I will analyze the dependent
variables and potential continuous covariates for significant correlations using the
Pearson correlation coefficient (r). Significant correlations between the dependent
variables suggest that they must be evaluated simultaneously using multivariate statistics.
If the dependent variables are significantly correlated, as I expect them to be for the
repeated measures variables, I will use MANOVA or MANCOVA, as indicated. If the
dependent variables are not significantly correlated, I will use univariate analysis,
ANOVA or ANCOVA to test hypotheses.
If the data does not adhere to the required assumptions for parametric tests, I will
analyze the dependent variables and covariates for significant correlations using the
Spearman rank correlations (rho). I will then test the hypotheses using nonparametric
tests. I will use the Mann-Whitney, two independent samples test in place of ANOVA. I
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will use the Friedman Test for K related samples in place of repeated measures
MANOVA.
I will also complete a post hoc analysis to explore interesting or unusual findings
not formally specified by the hypotheses.
3.10 Pilot Study
3.10.1 Pilot Background and Descriptive Statistics
I conducted a pilot study to gather preliminary data and assess the validity of the
instrument.15 Participants were undergraduate audit students at a large metropolitan
university. Since students do not have an in-group affiliation with a particular audit firm,
I manipulated the group variable by characterizing the client as either a graduate of the
participant’s university (in-group) or as a graduate of an unnamed university (out-group).
I also collected additional demographic data relating to grade point average and courses
taken.
Twenty-three participants took the survey; I eliminated four because they failed
the group manipulation check. Of the remaining 19, four took under 8 minutes to
complete the instrument. Given the length of the instrument, it is unreasonable to believe
that those participants supplied the requisite effort and I excluded them from the final
analysis. Of the remaining 15 participants, seven received the in-group treatment and
eight received the out-group treatment. The mean time to complete was approximately 24

15

Prior to the pilot data collection, two expert auditors previewed the instrument to determine face validity,
realism, and clarity. Experts indicated that the task and background information was both believable and
appropriate for novice auditors. I made several small changes to the question text to improve clarity.
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minutes, average age was 25 years, and mean GPA was 3.3. Gender was fairly even
within each group. Table 1, Panel A includes descriptive statistics. Panel B of Table 1
includes dependent variable data by group.
TABLE 1 – PILOT STUDY
(All participants n = 15)
Panel A
Descriptive Statistics
Time to Complete
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Grade Point Average
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

24.08
8.08
16
36
9
6
24.08
4.82
21
36
3.31
.39
2.30
3.80

Panel B
Dependent Variables by Group (mean, standard deviation, range)
Post-decision
Aid
Plausibility

Post-decision
Aid
Confidence

47.14
(19.12)
25-80

67.14
(20.38)
40-90

Postdecision
Aid Extent
of testing
14.43
(8.81)
3-90

10.38
(6.84)
0-20

55.63
(24.12)
10-85

80.63
(14.25)
60-100

8.88
(5.64)
0-20

10.87
(6.91)

51.67
(21.60)

74.33
(18.11)

11.47
(7.58)

Initial
Plausibility

Initial
Confidence

Ingroup
n=7

56.43
(20.56)
30-90

62.14
(17.29)
40-90

Initial
Extent
of
testing
11.43
(7.84)
0-20

Outgroup
n=8

49.50
(27.73)
10-90

78.75
(13.29)
60-100

Overall
n= 15

52.73
(24.05)

71.00
(17.03)
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3.10.2 Pilot Study Results
The small sample size made analysis of the data for assumptions of normality and
equal variance problematic. To address this issue, I used nonparametric methods to
analyze the data. Conover (1999) suggests using the Mann-Whitney, two independent
samples test, when analyzing data which are not normally distributed. Prior to analysis, I
analyzed the data for outliers. Noting none, all data were retained within the analysis.
Although the raw mean for initial plausibility indicates that in-group auditors rate
plausibility higher than do out-group auditors, statistical tests show insufficient support
(p=.310) for hypothesis one. Hypothesis two predicts that auditors will be less confident
in their judgment when an implausible explanation comes from an in-group member than
when it comes from an out-group member. Mean confidence measurements support this
hypothesis as mean in-group confidence (62.14) is lower than mean out-group confidence
(78.75). Using a Mann-Whitney test, there is a significant difference in confidence
between groups (p=.035) demonstrating support for hypothesis two.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that in-group bias could affect an auditor’s decision to
extend testing, even though the auditor has correctly identified the explanation as
implausible. Hypothesis 3 is tested both pre- and post-decision aid. To test this
hypothesis, responses were split into high (≥50) and low (<50) plausibility groups,
resulting in 9 high responses and 6 low responses pre-decision aid and 6 high responses
and 9 low responses post-decision aid. Using the Mann-Whitney test, I found no
significant support either pre-decision aid (p=.251) or post-decision aid (p=.400) to
indicate that auditors who correctly identify an explanation as implausible will extend
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testing less when the explanation is given by an in-group member. Although I found no
support during the pilot test, recall that the pilot subjects are not auditors, and therefore,
have little experience in making decisions about extending testing during fieldwork.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that decision aid use will reduce effectively reduce
plausibility judgments for auditors who have initial incorrect judgments. Conover (1999)
suggests using the nonparametric Friedman test as a substitute for parametric repeated
measures analysis when comparing several related samples. Using the Friedman test,
results indicate that the decision aid did not significantly change auditor judgments
(p=.353). Hypothesis 5 suggests that confidence will increase post-decision aid. Using
the Friedman test, there is insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 5 (p=.125).
Finally, Hypothesis 6 predicts that auditors who make a correct post-decision aid
judgment will also increase their decision to extend testing. Although raw mean hours
increased post-decision aid, there is insufficient evidence to support a significant
difference between pre-and post-decision aid extent of testing.
3.10.3 Discussion of Design Changes
The pilot study was undertaken to provide preliminary data as well as identify
potential weaknesses in the research design. One caveat is that the group manipulation in
the pilot study did not exactly replicate the planned group manipulation in the main study
(university rather than audit firm affiliation).
Based on the pilot study results, I made several changes to the instrument. Since
four of the 23 participants (17 percent) could not recall the group manipulation, I made
the manipulation more salient. I significantly reduced the amount of information given
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about the client background and presented it in bullet point format. I added an accounting
knowledge question to confirm the auditors’ internal knowledge about account
relationships. I included a question about the participant’s experience with affiliated
clients, and modified a question pertaining to skepticism training. Finally, I simplified the
decision aid in order to make its content more salient.
Expert auditors indicated that staff auditors often complete tasks similar to the one
in the study. However, they also noted that based on the amount of background
information, several alternative explanations exist for the change in repair and
maintenance expense. Peecher and Solomon (2001) suggest that internal validity is more
important than mundane realism. Therefore, I reduced the amount of information in the
financial statements and firm background to make the task more manageable for the
participants. This change reduces noise and eliminates alternative explanations for the
change in account balances. The final instrument can be found in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
4.1 Background and Descriptive Statistics
I collected data over a three-month period using an online survey software
application. Participants were staff and senior auditors from five large national firms; all
were located in the Southeastern United States. Fifty-five auditors answered the survey;
fifty-three completed all questions. Eleven failed the group manipulation check and three
failed the accounting knowledge check, leaving forty-one usable responses for the group
bias hypotheses.16 Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics. Participants included
twenty-two seniors and nineteen staff auditors. Mean time to complete the survey was
nineteen minutes, with a minimum of 9.25 and a maximum of 58.18. A frequency
distribution is included in Figure 5. Average age was about thirty for seniors and twentyfive for staff members. Mean experience with analytical procedures was twenty-seven
times (about thirty-nine times for seniors and only six times for staff members). On
average, senior auditors worked with affiliated clients thirteen percent of the time, staff
members worked with affiliated clients only about six percent of the time. Table 2 shows
the number of participants per treatment group. Twenty-four were in-group (client was a

16

The 25 percent failure rate is high and indicates that these individuals did not attend to the manipulation.
While none of the participants who failed the group treatment manipulation check indicated an incorrect
client affiliation, all eleven answered that they were unable to tell the client’s prior affiliation given the
information provided. Given that these participants did not attend to the manipulation, they were dropped
from the analysis of hypotheses related to group. Inclusion of these eleven does not qualitatively change
results. The three auditors who failed the accounting knowledge check did not demonstrate sufficient
knowledge to accurately complete the initial step in plausibility determination. They were also dropped
form the analysis.
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former audit firm employee) and seventeen were out-group (client was a long-time
employee of the client firm).
FIGURE 5

Frequency Distribution of Time to Complete For All Participants
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TABLE 2 – PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS FOR GROUP BIAS
HYPOTHESES TESTS
(All participants n = 41)
Panel A- Descriptive Statistics
Seniors Staff Overall
(n=22) (n=19) (n=41)
Time to Complete
Mean
17.51
20.28
19.04
Standard Deviation
5.31
14.43
10.44
Minimum
9.53
9.25
9.25
Maximum
30.28
58.18
58.18
Gender
Male
17
10
27
Female
5
9
14
Age
Mean
30.59
25.63
28.39
Standard Deviation
8.18
4.30
7.00
Minimum
24
23
23
Maximum
55
41
55
Analytical Procedures Experience (# of times)
Mean
39.41
6.43
26.37
Standard Deviation
44.73
10.56
37.12
Minimum
2
0
0
Maximum
200
40
200
Experience with Affiliated Clients (% of total clients)
Mean
13.41
6.16
9.22
Standard Deviation
20.01
13.01
16.87
Minimum
0
0
0
Maximum
80
50
80
Certified Public Accountant
18
7
25
Highest Education Level
B.S. Accounting
6
4
10
Master of Accounting
14
10
24
Master of Business Administration
2
3
5
Master - Other
0
2
2
Panel B – NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN EACH TREATMENT CONDITION
Participants per Treatment
N
Senior
Staff
In-group
22
11
11
Out-group
19
13
6
Total
41
24
17
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4.2 Correlation Matrices
A comprehensive statistical analysis requires the evaluation of correlations among
the dependent variables. If the dependent variables are significantly correlated, a
multivariate approach is appropriate. Furthermore, significant correlation of potential
continuous covariates with the dependent variables justifies their inclusion in the
statistical analysis. I also evaluate correlations between the demographic variables (age,
gender, level, analytical procedures experience, and affiliated percentage) and the
dependent variables (plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing). Noting no significant
correlations, I do not plan to include these demographics variables in the model.
Table 3 includes the Spearman rank correlation coefficient matrices (chosen
because of the non-normality of the data) for the fifty participants who passed the
accounting knowledge check17. All three post-decision aid dependent variables,
plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing are significantly positively correlated with
their respective pre-decision aid variables. This correlation supports the use of the
Friedman test for repeated measures. Pre-decision aid extension of testing is significantly
negatively correlated with initial plausibility (rho = -.481). Likewise, post-decision aid
extension of testing is significantly negatively correlated with post-decision aid
plausibility. These findings suggest support that lower plausibility judgments lead to
increased testing, as predicted by Hypothesis 6.

17

Results for the sample excluding the group manipulation check failures are not qualitatively different.
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4.3 Statistical Analysis
Prior to hypothesis testing, I evaluated the data for compliance with the required
statistical assumptions. Random assignment to groups implies that observations are
independent for the between-subjects variable, group, but are not independent for the
within-subjects factor, decision aid. Univariate analysis relies on an assumption of
normality of the dependent variable (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996). To test for
univariate normality, I visually analyzed stem and leaf plots and histograms for each
dependent variable (plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing) across groups. Given
the small sample size, it was difficult to judge normality from the graphs alone. I also
analyzed the dependent variables for normality using formal statistical tests: ShapiroWilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov with Lilliefors significance correction. Table 4 includes
results. Based on these tests, the dependent variables are not normally distributed.
However, these tests are highly sensitive to even small departures from normality and are
therefore of limited use (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996).
TABLE 4 – TESTS OF NORMALITY FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Pre-Decision Aid
Plausibility
Confidence
Extent of Testing

Out
In
Out
In
Out
In

.185
.172
.286
.204
.223
.187

19
20
19
20
19
20

.088
.124
.000
.028
.014
.066

.870
.880
.816
.820
.829
.860

19
20
19
20
19
20

.015
.018
.002
.002
.003
.008

Out
In
Out
In
Out
In

.223
.232
.258
.222
.203
.207

19
20
19
20
19
20

.014
.006
.002
.011
.039
.024

.852
.826
.856
.822
.775
.832

19
20
19
20
19
20

.007
.002
.008
.002
.001
.003

Post-decision Aid
Plausibility
Confidence
Extent of Testing

60

To address these concerns, I used the more appropriate nonparametric tests, which
do not rely on the assumption of normality. For hypotheses that test variables with
independent observations, I used the Mann-Whitney tests. For hypotheses that test
repeated measures variables, I used the Friedman test.
I evaluated the data for outliers and noted observations with values greater or less
than two standard deviations from the mean. Three observations for initial confidence fit
this criterion (all rated confidence at 10), while two observations for extent of testing fit
this criterion, (rated at 40.00 and 60.00). Removing these observations did not
qualitatively change results. Given the small sample size and limited justification for
removal, I retained these observations within the dataset.

4.3.1 In-Group Bias and its Effect on Initial Audit Judgment
The purpose of this section is to report the findings as to whether in-group bias
affects auditor plausibility judgments. Prior to testing this hypothesis, I used MannWhitney to confirm that there was no statistically significant difference between groups
in auditors’ ratings of client competence (p=.200). Thus, I am reasonably assured that
each group perceived the client equally competent and that differences in plausibility
judgments are unaffected by differences in client competence judgments. Table 5, Panel
A displays the plausibility judgment mean, standard deviation, range and number of
participants by level and treatment group. Participants rated plausibility on a 101-point
scale where 0 indicates “not at all plausible” and 100 indicates “highly plausible.” I first
reviewed the plausibility raw means for the total sample, noting that means were in the
expected direction (in-group 54.50 and out-group 47.84). Using the Mann-Whitney
nonparametric statistic, I found insufficient support to conclude that groups were

61

significantly different (p=.572 two-tailed). Upon further analysis, I noted that senior
means were in the expected direction (in-group 56.64 and out-group 35.36), while staff
means were in the opposite direction. Using Mann-Whitney, I tested the significance for
seniors only, finding insufficient support (p=.097 one-tailed) to conclude a significant
difference between groups.
TABLE 5 – TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON INITIAL PLAUSIBILITY
JUDGMENT a
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A- Descriptives
Senior

Staff

56.64
52.36
54.50
(36.34)
(36.35)
(35.54)
In-Group
10-95
1-100
22
11
11
35.36
65.00
47.84
(31.96)
(23.76)
Out-Group
(31.83)
10-89
25-95
19
11
8
46.00
57.68
(35.12)
(31.54)
22
19
a- Plausibility is measured on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all plausible”
and 100 is “highly plausible”
(1) Using Mann-Whitney, one-tailed p-value is insignificant at the .05 level.
(2) No test is performed as means are in the opposite direction of prediction.

Panel B – Total Sample
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample
Plausibility

Group
Out-group
In-group
Total

N
19
22
41
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Mean Rank
19.87
21.98

Sum of Ranks
377.50
483.50

Test Statistics Plausibility by Group for Total Sample

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

Plausibility
187.500
377.500
-.565
.572

Panel C – Seniors Only
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Seniors

Plausibility

Ingroup
1
0
1
Total

N
11
11
22

Mean
Rank
9.68
13.32

Sum of
Ranks
106.50
146.50

Test Statistics by Group for Seniors

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)
Exact Sig. [2*(1tailed Sig.)]
One tailed Sig.

Plausibility
40.500
106.500
-1.338
.181
.193
.097

4.3.2 In-group Bias and it Effect on Auditor Confidence
Hypothesis 2 predicts that participants who received an implausible
explanation from an in-group client would be less confident in their initial
judgment than auditors who received an implausible explanation from an outgroup client. Table 6, Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, range and
number of participants by level and treatment group for the initial confidence
variable. Participants indicated their confidence level on a 101-point scale where
0 indicates “not at all confident” and 100 indicates “completely confident”. Means
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are in the predicted direction for the total sample (in-group 62.50 and out-group
71.95), for the seniors (in-group 64.09 and out-group 74.27) and for the staff (ingroup 60.91 and out-group 68.75). Using Mann-Whitney tests, there is
insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 2 for the total sample (p=.654), for
senior auditors (p=.562), or for staff auditors (p=.968).
TABLE 6 – TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON INITIAL CONFIDENCE a
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A - Descriptives
Senior

Staff

64.09
60.91
62.50
(32.24)
(32.47)
In-Group
(31.61)
10-95
15-90
22
11
11
74.27
68.75
71.95
(30.06)
(15.30)
Out-Group
(24.51)
10-100
45-85
19
11
8
69.18
64.21
(30.86)
(26.31)
22
19
a – confidence is measured on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all confident” and 100
is “completely confident”.

Panel B – Total Sample
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample

Initial
Confidence

Group
Out-group
In-group
Total

N
19
22
41
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Mean
Rank
21.89
20.23

Sum of
Ranks
416.00
445.00

Test Statistics by Group for Total Sample

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

Initial
Confidence
192.000
445.000
-.449
.654

Panel C - Seniors
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Seniors

Initial
Confidence

Group
Out-group
In-group
Total

N
11
11
22

Mean
Rank
12.36
10.64

Sum of
Ranks
136.00
117.00

Test Statistics by Group for Seniors

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)
Exact Sig. [2*(1tailed Sig.)]

Initial
Confidence
51.000
117.000
-.632
.527
.562

Panel D – Staff
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Staff

Initial
Confidence

Group
Out-group
In-group
Total

N
8
11
19
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Mean
Rank
9.88
10.09

Sum of
Ranks
79.00
111.00

Test Statistics by Group for Staff

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)
Exact Sig. [2*(1tailed Sig.)]

Confidence
1
43.000
79.000
-.083
.934
.968

4.3.3 In-group Bias and it Effect on Auditor Decisions to Extend Testing
Hypothesis 3 predicts that in-group bias persists in an auditor’s decision to extend
testing, even when the auditor correctly identifies the explanation as implausible. For this
test, I used a subset of “low plausibility” auditors to represent auditors who are correct. In
lieu of a normative answer, I considered auditors who rated plausibility less than 50 % to
be correct. Table 7, Panel A displays the mean, standard deviation, and range for the
dependent variable extent of testing. Panel A also includes the number of participants by
level and treatment group. The extent of testing measurement represents the number of
hours participants chose to extend analytical procedures testing. Participants selected this
amount after making plausibility and confidence judgments. Using a Mann-Whitney test,
I evaluated this hypothesis both pre and post-decision aid. As noted in section 4.2,
plausibility rating is significantly correlated with the dependent variable of interest
“decision to extend testing” both pre- and post-decision aid. Partitioning the sample to
include only “correct” responses should sufficiently address this correlation. Initial extent
of testing is significantly correlated (rho = .881) with post-decision aid extent of testing,
but cannot be accommodated by nonparametric procedures. An analysis of the raw means
for each group indicates that extent of testing is in the opposite direction from predicted
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for both pre-decision aid (in-group 14.89 and out-group 11.11) and post-decision aid (ingroup 17.44 and out-group 12.44). Given the raw means for auditors who correctly assess
an explanation, a statistical test is unjustified. There is insufficient evidence that group
affiliation impacts the auditor’s decision to extend testing either pre- or post-decision aid.
A post hoc analysis in section 4.4 further investigates this finding.

TABLE 7– TEST OF IN-GROUP BIAS ON DECISION TO EXTEND TESTING:
CORRECT JUDGMENTS ONLY
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)

In-Group
Extent of Testing
Out-Group
Extent of Testing

Pre-decision Aid

Post -decision Aid

14.89
(11.67)
2-40
9
11.11
(9.33)
0-20
9

17.44
(13.99)
4-40
9
12.44
(8.05)
0-20
9

4.3.4 Discussion of Analysis of Decision Aid Hypotheses
As noted in section 4.1, eleven participants failed to answer the group
manipulation check correctly. Given that I found insufficient support to indicate the
presence of in-group bias (and there is no reason to believe that group bias affects
decision aid effectiveness), there is no justification to exclude the participants who failed
the manipulation check from the analysis. I test the decision aid hypotheses using the
complete sample18. Table 8 includes descriptive statistics for the sample including
manipulation check failures.

18

Note that two of the additional participants failed to indicate post-decision plausibility, confidence, and
extent of testing, resulting in a final sample of 50.
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TABLE 8– PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS FOR DECISION AID
HYPOTHESES TESTS
(All participants n = 50)
Seniors
(n=26)
Time to Complete
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Analytical Procedures Experience (# of times)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Experience with Affiliated Clients (% of total clients)
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Certified Public Accountant
Highest Education Level
B.S. Accounting
Master of Accounting
Master of Business Administration
Master - Other

Staff Overall
(n=24) (n=50)

19.27
12.49
9.53
45.36

18.17
12.49
9.25
58.18

18.53
11.14
9.25
58.18

21
5

14
10

35
15

31.04
8.59
24
55

26.08
4.39
23
41

28.66
7.28
23
55

38.12
44.67
2
200

5.72
10.75
0
40

25.87
39.91
0
200

13.48
18.56
0
80
22

7.71
16.77
0
75
8

10.65
17.92
0
80
30

8
15
3
0

4
14
4
2

12
29
7
2

4.3.5 Decision Aid Use and its Effect on Auditor Plausibility Judgments
Hypothesis 4 tests for the effectiveness of a decision aid on improving plausibility
judgments for auditors who were initially incorrect. In this study, a reduction in
plausibility rating represents an improvement in judgment (since the explanation given is
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implausible). I partition the total sample by initial plausibility judgments considering
judgments greater than or equal to 50% as incorrect. As shown in Table 9, Panel A,
overall, plausibility judgments decreased after use of the decision aid (initial plausibility
mean 75.77 and post-decision aid plausibility mean 49.76). The appropriate
nonparametric test for related samples is the Friedman test (Conover 1999). Results for
the Friedman test for the total sample (Table 9, Panel B) find support for the effectiveness
of the decision aid to improve plausibility judgments (p=.000). Hypothesis 4 is supported.
Additional analysis finds that hypothesis 4 is also supported for seniors (Table 7, Panel
C) (p=.008) and for staff (Table 9, Panel D) (p=.001).
TABLE 9– EFFECT OF DECISION AID ON AUDITOR PLAUSIBILITY
JUDGMENTS (Incorrect auditors only)
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A – Descriptives

Pre-decision Aid
Plausibility
Post-decision Aid
Plausibility

Seniors
80.33
(14.00)
50-95
12
55.73
(34.65)
0-95
11

Staff
72.89
(16.36)
50-100
19
46.11
(32.34)
0-100
18

Panel B – Total Sample
Friedman Ranks for Total Sample

Pre-decision Aid Plausibility
Post-decision Aid Plausibility
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Mean Rank
1.84
1.16

75.77
(15.68)
31
49.76
(32.96)
29

Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Total Sample
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

29
18.182
1
.000

Panel C –Seniors
Friedman Ranks for Seniors
Mean Rank
1.82
1.18

Pre-decision Aid Plausibility
Post-decision Aid Plausibility

Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Seniors
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

11
7.000
1
.008

Panel D – Staff
Friedman Ranks for Staff
Mean Rank
1.86
1.14

Pre-decision Aid Plausibility
Post-decision Aid Plausibility

Test Statistics for Change in Plausibility for Staff
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

18
11.267
1
.001

Section 4.3.6 Effect of Decision Aid on Confidence
Hypothesis 5 predicts that auditor confidence will increase post decision aid. I
measured confidence on a 101-point scale where 0 is “not at all confident” and 100 is
“completely confident.” Table 10 includes the mean, standard deviation, range and
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number of observations. Pre-decision aid confidence ratings ranged from 10 to 100, with
a mean of 68.79 (standard deviation 27.96). Post-decision aid confidence ratings ranged
from 0-100 with a mean of 65.74 (standard deviation 32.72). Contrary to expectations,
raw mean confidence scores decreased for both seniors and staff members; thus
Hypothesis 5 is not supported. Section 4.4 contains a post hoc analysis that explores the
changes in confidence.
TABLE 10–CHANGE IN CONFIDENCE POST-DECISION AID
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Descriptives

Pre-decision Aid
Confidence
Post-decision Aid
Confidence

Seniors
69.70
(30.99)
10-100
27
66.92
(35.28)
0-100
26

Staff
67.80
(24.88)
15-95
25
64.46
(24.88)
0-100
24

68.79
(27.96)
52
65.74
(32.72)
50

Section 4.3.7 Effect of Decision Aid on Extent of Testing
As noted, it is insufficient to examine auditor judgments alone, as auditor
decisions ultimately impact audit effectiveness. This test explores whether auditors will
improve their decisions after using a decision aid. Hypothesis 6 predicts that auditors who
initially make an incorrect judgment, will increase their extent of testing after using a
decision aid. In keeping with prior procedures, I restrict my analysis to auditors who
initially provided an incorrect judgment (plausibility judgment greater than or equal to
50%). Table 11, Panel A includes the mean, standard deviation, and range for the
dependent variable extent of testing both pre- and post-decision aid. After having access
to the decision aid, participants increased testing by 61 %, from 6.34 hours to 10.21
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hours. Using the Friedman test, which is the appropriate nonparametric statistic for a
repeated measures analysis, this increase in the extent of testing is significantly greater
post-decision aid for the total sample (p=.000). Additional analysis shows that
Hypothesis 6 is also supported for staff auditors (p=.001), but not for senior auditors
(p=.083). Section 4.4 includes a post hoc analysis of changes in extent of testing for
auditors who are initially correct.
TABLE 11 – TEST OF EFFECT OF DECISION AID ON EXTENT OF TESTING
(INITIALLY INCORRECT AUDITORS ONLY)
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A – Descriptives

Pre-decision aid
Extent of Testing
Post-decision aid
Extent of Testing

Seniors
5.00
(5.79)
0-16
11
6.27
(5.06)
0-16
11

Staff
7.17
(8.38)
0-30
18
12.61
(14.86)
0-60
18

6.34
(7.28)
29
10.21
(12.37)
29

Panel B – Total Sample
Friedman Ranks for Total Sample

Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing

Mean Rank
1.26
1.74

Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Total Sample
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
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29
14.000
1
.000

Panel C – Seniors
Friedman Ranks for Seniors

Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing

Mean Rank
1.36
1.64

Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Seniors
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

11
3.000
1
.083

Panel D – Staff
Friedman Ranks for Staff
Pre-decision Aid Extent of Testing
Post-decision Aid Extent of Testing

Mean Rank
1.19
1.81

Test Statistics for Change in Extent of Testing for Staff
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

18
11.000
1
.001

4.4 Post Hoc Analysis
I perform the following post hoc analyses to investigate prior nonsignificant
findings and to explore relevant relationships.
Hypothesis 3 suggested that in-group bias could cause auditors who correctly
identified a client explanation as implausible to curtail additional testing. I found no
support to indicate that group bias affects decisions to extend testing. However, it is
important to confirm that auditors who correctly identified a client explanation as
implausible did, in fact, increase testing (independent of group). I conducted the
following Mann-Whitney nonparametric test to confirm that auditors who judged the
client explanation as implausible increased testing more than auditors who judged the
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client explanation as plausible. Table 12 includes the ranks and test statistics. Findings
suggest that auditors acted as expected and that decisions to extend testing logically
followed judgments (p=.008).
TABLE 12 POST HOC ANALYSIS OF EXTENT OF TESTING
Mann-Whitney Ranks for Total Sample

Initial Extent
of Testing

Initial
Plausibility
Correct
Incorrect
Total

N
21
31
52

Mean
Rank
33.21
21.95

Sum of
Ranks
697.50
680.50

Test Statistics by Group for Total Sample

Mann-Whitney U
Wilcoxon W
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2tailed)

Initial
Extent of
Testing
184.500
680.500
-2.653
.008

Hypothesis 5 proposed that confidence would increase post-decision aid for all
auditors. A post hoc analysis analyzed the changes in confidence by initial plausibility,
separating auditor into groups of initially correct and initially incorrect. Table 13, Panel
A includes descriptive statistics. Table 13, Panel B reports the Friedman test statistics for
pre- and post-decision aid confidence for auditors who were initially correct. Confidence
significantly increased post-decision aid (p=.005). This result is logical because the
decision aid provided confirming evidence. It also partially supports Hypothesis 5. Table
13, Panel C reports Friedman test statistics for pre- and post-decision aid confidence for
auditors who were initially incorrect. While raw means indicate that confidence
decreased post-decision aid, this decrease was not significant (p=.127).
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TABLE 13 - POST HOC ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENCE BY INITIAL
JUDGMENT
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A

Pre-decision aid
Confidence
Post-decision aid
Confidence

Initially Correct

Initially Incorrect

64.52
(35.03)
10-100
21
71.57
(33.36)
10-100
21

72.66
(21.33)
10-95
29
61.52
(32.16)
0-100
29

Panel B
Friedman Ranks for Initially Correct Auditors
Mean
Rank
Pre-decision aid
Confidence
Post-decision aid
Confidence

1.31
1.69

Test Statistics for Initially Correct Auditors
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

21
8.000
1
.005

Panel C
Friedman Ranks for Initially Incorrect Auditors
Mean
Rank
Pre-decision aid
Confidence
Post-decision aid
Confidence
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1.62
1.38

Test Statistics for Initially Incorrect Auditors
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

29
2.333
1
.127

Hypothesis 6 examines whether decision aid use improves decisions for auditors
who are initially incorrect. I performed additional testing to confirm that auditors who are
initially correct also increase testing post-decision aid. Table 14, Panel A provides
descriptive statistics of pre- and post-decision aid extent of testing for initially correct
auditors. Table 14, Panel B shows test results. There is significant support (p=.014) that
initially correct auditors also increased testing post-decision aid.
TABLE 14 - POST HOC ANALYSIS OF EXTENT OF TESTING FOR
INITIALLY CORRECT AUDITORS
(mean, standard deviation, range, n)
Panel A
Pre-decision aid
Extent of Testing
Post-decision aid
Extent of Testing

13.29
(10.05)
0-40
21
15.57
(11.01)
0-40
21

Panel B
Friedman Ranks for Initially Correct Auditors
Mean Rank
Pre-decision aid
Extent of Testing
Post-decision aid
Extent of Testing

1.36
1.64
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Test Statistics for Initially Correct Auditors
N
Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.
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21
6.000
1
.014

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
5.1 Discussion of Results
Table 15 includes a summary of findings. I found no support for an in-group bias
effect on auditor plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments or decisions to
extend testing. I found strong support for the effect of a decision aid on improvements in
auditor plausibility judgments and decisions to extend testing. I found no support for an
increase in confidence post-decision aid. I follow with a discussion of findings and
possible reasons for lack of significant findings.
TABLE 15 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Hypothesis
1
2
3 (pre-decision
aid)
3 (post-decision
aid)
4
5

IV
Group
Group

Decision Aid
Decision Aid

6

Decision Aid

Group
Group

DV
Plausibility
Confidence
Extent of
Testing
Extent of
Testing
Plausibility
Confidence
Extent of
Testing

Supported
No
No

p-value
.572
.654

No

---

No

---

Yes
No

.000
---

Yes

.000

Legislation that restricts client hiring of former external auditors provides
evidence that there is a belief that in-group bias exists and that it affects auditor
independence. Although theory suggests that individuals demonstrate in-group bias in the
form of extending unjustified trust to their group members, auditors may or may not
exhibit this bias in an audit context. I employ an experiment to investigate potential
differences in auditor judgments based on the client’s former employment with the audit
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firm. Hypothesis 1 predicted that auditors would judge an explanation from an in-group
client as more plausible than an explanation from an out-group client.
I partitioned the sample into seniors and staff to analyze the data in more detail.
An analysis of raw means for seniors indicated that plausibility judgments were, in fact,
higher for the in-group treatment, (56.64 versus 35.36); however, the difference was not
statistically significant. Raw means for staff auditors’ plausibility judgments are in the
opposite direction with out-group plausibility judgments higher than in-group plausibility
judgments (65.00 versus 52.36); again, the difference is not statistically significant. The
raw means do suggest that seniors are more likely to exhibit in-group bias than are staff
auditors. Seniors could be more likely to exhibit in-group bias because they likely have
been a part of the audit firm group for a longer period of time than have staff auditors. In
addition, staff auditors are likely recent graduates of accounting programs. These
programs typically cover professional standards, which emphasize professional
skepticism. The emphasis on skepticism could cause staff auditors to pay close attention
to client source reliability, thus mitigating in-group bias. Although the current study
found insufficient evidence to support an effect of in-group bias on auditor plausibility
judgments in an analytical procedures task, increasing the sample size of senior auditors
only might shed light on the prevalence of in-group bias.
While theory supports finding a difference, there are several possible reasons why
I did not find a significant difference. These include lack of power, experimental
weaknesses, or absence of a difference in fact. First, I had access to a limited sample of
auditors, which resulted in a small pool of participants. To rectify this situation, I plan to
collect additional data. Second, several participants failed the manipulation check and
were removed from the analysis. A failed manipulation check is often the result of an
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experimental weakness. I plan to improve the study by making the client affiliation
manipulation more salient, perhaps by including detailed information about the
controller’s background, particularly his or her experience at the audit (client) firm.
Finally, it may be that auditors do not exhibit in-group bias when performing audit
procedures. Both extensive training and attention to professional skepticism act against
an individual’s inclination to exhibit in-group bias and could mitigate this bias.
Hypothesis 2 predicted an effect of in-group bias on confidence such that auditors
who received an implausible explanation from an in-group client would be less confident
in their plausibility judgments than an auditor who received the same explanation from an
out-group client. Although there is insufficient evidence to support a statistical difference
between groups, the raw means are in a direction consistent with Hypothesis 2. In-group
seniors have a mean confidence level of 64.09, while out-group seniors demonstrate a
higher mean confidence of 74.27. The same relationship holds for staff members’ mean
confidence: in-group, 60.91 and out-group, 68.75. Prior research has indicated that
factors such as experience and gender could moderate confidence. Although I collected
data regarding participants’ analytical procedures experience and gender demographics,
the use of nonparametric statistics prevented their inclusion in the analysis, since there is
no nonparametric procedure that allows for the inclusion of covariates. A larger sample
size could allow the use of parametric statistics, which, in turn, accommodate models that
are more powerful and allow for the inclusion of covariates.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that in-group bias would affect an auditor’s decision to
extend testing such that even though the auditor had made a correct plausibility judgment,
he or she would extend testing less if the client was a former audit team member. In other
words, even though an auditor “knows” that a client is providing an implausible
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explanation, he or she could still choose to “overlook” the inconsistency of the
explanation because the client is a former auditor from his or her firm. I tested for this
effect both pre- and post-decision aid. I examined the means and found that pre-decision
aid, in-group auditors extended testing by 14.89 hours, while out-group auditors extended
testing an average of 11.11 hours. Likewise, post-decision aid measures show that ingroup auditors extended testing by 17.44 hours, while out-group members extended
testing by only 12.44 hours. Although there is no evidence of a group effect, in a post hoc
analysis, I analyzed extent of testing to confirm that an auditor who makes a correct
initial plausibility judgment extends testing more than an auditor who makes an incorrect
initial plausibility judgment. I find significant support that auditors do, in fact, extend
testing more when they are correct than when they are incorrect. This finding indicates
that participants expended the requisite cognitive effort to the task. Thus, results likely
indicate that there is no in-group bias in auditors’ decisions to extend testing in an
analytical procedures task.
In addition to testing for group biases, I also examined whether a simple decision
aid could improve auditors’ plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments, and
decisions. Hypothesis 4 predicted that auditors who provided initially incorrect (high
plausibility) judgments, would decrease those judgments after using a decision aid.
Nonparametric statistical analyses provided evidence that decision aids improved
auditors’ plausibility judgments in an analytical procedures task. This effect was
supported for the total sample and for staff and senior auditors independently. Seniors
significantly reduced their plausibility judgments from 80.33 to 55.73, while staff
auditors significantly reduced their plausibility judgments from 72.89to 46.11. These
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findings justify the effectiveness of a simple decision aid in improving auditors’
performance during analytical procedures.
Prior literature indicates confidence improves as individuals gather more
information. Hypothesis 5 predicted that auditors would increase their confidence after
using a decision aid. A review of the raw means indicated that confidence decreased
overall for both seniors (69.70 to 66.92) and staff members (67.80 to 64.46). I explored
the change in confidence further in a post hoc analysis. Confirmation bias suggests that
individuals tend to disregard disconfirming evidence and overweight confirming
evidence. Although I found no prior literature indicating that this effect is associated with
changes in confidence, I chose to partition the sample by initial plausibility judgment to
explore this variable further. I found that for auditors who were initially correct (low
plausibility), confidence significantly increased after using a decision aid. The decision
aid’s confirmation of their original judgment likely is responsible for their increased
confidence. However, confidence for auditors who were initially incorrect showed a
marginally significant decrease. This decreased confidence is possibly a result of the
disconfirming evidence provided to those auditors by the decision aid. Although initially
incorrect auditors improved their plausibility judgment post-decision aid (indicating
reliance on the decision aid), they would logically have felt less confident about their
own ability to audit. It is possible that when they answered the confidence question, they
were indicating confidence in their ability, rather than confidence in that particular
judgment.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the use of a decision aid would improve auditors’
decisions to extend testing. As I did before in the tests for Hypothesis 4 (effect of
decision aid on plausibility judgments); I partitioned the sample, choosing only auditors
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who were initially incorrect (high plausibility). I found that those auditors significantly
increased the extent of testing after using a decision aid. This finding supports the
effectiveness of a decision aid on auditor decisions to extend testing in an analytical
procedures task. I also analyzed the participants by level. While senior auditors increased
their extent of testing from a mean of 5.00 to 6.27, (the correct direction but a statistically
insignificant difference), staff auditors increased their extent of testing from 7.17 to
12.61, (a statistically significant difference). Although only staff auditors increased
testing significantly, seniors also increased testing. These findings support the hypothesis
that decision aids improve decisions to extend testing.
A post hoc analysis explores the effect of a decision aid on extent of testing for
initially correct (low plausibility) auditors. Raw means for extent of testing increased
from 13.29 pre-decision aid to 15.57 post-decision aid. This increase was statistically
significant, demonstrating that decision aids are effective in improving auditor decisions
for both initially correct and initially incorrect auditors.
5.2 Summary
This study had two objectives: first, to investigate whether in-group bias was
evident in auditors’ judgments, confidence in those judgments, and decisions and second,
to examine whether a decision aid was effective in improving auditors’ judgments,
confidence in those judgments, and decisions. Auditors completed an online task in
which they evaluated client explanations for changes in an account balance. The client
source’s affiliation differed between participants – in-group clients were former members
of the participant’s audit firm, out-group members were long-time client employees.
Based on Social Identity Theory, I predicted that auditors would exhibit in-group bias in
their judgments and decisions, assigning a higher level of plausibility to explanations
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obtained from a former group member, and reducing testing for in-group client audits. I
found no effect for in-group bias on judgment, confidence in judgment, or extent of
testing.
After collecting auditors’ initial plausibility judgments, confidence ratings, and
decisions, I presented them with a decision aid report. I expected the structured design of
the report to improve audit plausibility judgments, confidence in those judgments, and
decisions to extend testing. The decision aid improved plausibility judgments for both
staff and senior auditors, and for both initially incorrect and initially correct auditors. The
decision aid also increased confidence for auditors who made initially correct judgments,
but not for auditors who were initially incorrect. For auditors who were initially incorrect,
there was a marginally significant reduction in confidence. Although decision aid use did
not result in increased confidence for all auditors, the decision aid resulted in improved
plausibility judgments and decisions to extend testing. Practitioners should note the
positive effects of providing a decision aid during analytical review.
Professional skepticism is necessary to audit effectively; however, auditors are
subject to human biases. An auditor’s failure to adjust appropriately his or her assessment
of client objectivity may compromise independence and audit effectiveness. Audit firms
should be aware of the potential for this bias, so that they can reduce the risk of audit
failure. Congress and the AICPA already have noted that the hiring of former audit team
members could lead to an impairment of independence and objectivity. This study sought
to improve the understanding of both the existence and extent of this claim. However,
due to the small sample size, results about in-group bias are inconclusive. Additional data
collection could provide results that are more conclusive.

84

A simple decision aid was effective in improving judgments overall. Both seniors
and staff members improved their judgments, as well as their decisions post-decision aid.
The decision aid also improved judgments and decisions not only for auditors who were
initially incorrect, but also for auditors who initially rated plausibility low. An added
benefit is that the decision aid increased confidence for auditors who were initially
correct. This increase in confidence possibly stems from the positive feedback offered by
the decision aid. The decision aid used in this study was a simple listing of account
relationships and expectations related to those relationships. The decision aid provided
valid, reasonable advice to auditors during the task. Audit firms could find the use of
simple decision aids a low-cost way to improve auditor performance.
5.3 Limitations
5.3.1 Small Sample Size
Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) list four elements to consider when using a
decision-based strategy for hypothesis testing.19 These elements are effect size, Type I
error, Type II error and sample size. In this study, effect size refers to the magnitude of
the difference between groups (and between pre- and post-decision aid) for the dependent
variables plausibility, confidence, and extent of testing. A Type I error (designated by α)
is the error of rejecting the null, when it should not have been rejected (Pedhazur and
Schmelkin 1991). In this case, a Type I error would be to conclude that there is an ingroup bias, when there is not actually an in-group bias. A Type II error (designated by β)
is the error of failing to reject the null hypothesis, when, in fact, it should be rejected.

19

A decision-based strategy refers to using a pre-determined value for hypothesis testing. For example,
when comparing two groups, setting an α (alpha) value to determine rejection of the null.
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This is also known as the power to detect a difference, should one exist. An example in
this study would be finding no significant group bias, when, in fact, there is a significant
group bias. Sample size, the fourth element, inter-relates with effect size, and both Type I
and Type II errors, such that increases in sample size, increase power, while decreases in
sample size decrease power (holding effect size constant). In this study, the sample size
was small, which made determination of normality of the data problematic. Without the
ability to confirm that the data was normal, I chose to use nonparametric statistical
methods (which do not rely on normality). Nonparametric methods are more likely to
result in a Type II error (less likely to detect differences). Given that I designed the study
with careful attention to internal validity, I estimate that my failure to detect group bias is
a result of either small sample size or small (no) bias effects in fact. While there is
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis (of no group bias), based on the data
collected, I likewise cannot conclude that in-group bias does not exist for auditors. By
increasing sample size in the future, I hope to arrive at results that are more conclusive.
5.3.2 Alternative Explanations
There are a number of limitations to consider in interpreting the results of the
current study. Given the heightened awareness of threats to independence resulting from
auditor affiliation, participants could have engaged in hypothesis guessing. Demand
effects from hypothesis guessing typically result in participants trying to “give the
researcher what he or she wants.” In this study, participants could have wanted to appear
in the best light possible, answering in such a way as to obscure their inclination toward
in-group bias.
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Limitations to the findings of a reduction in plausibility post decision-aid could
be due to a recency effect, rather than a mitigation of in-group bias. Recency argues that
auditors overweight information received later in a sequence.20 In this study, since
auditors receive the decision aid report last, they could have placed more weight on its
recommendation. Both Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) and Ashton and Ashton (1988) find
recency effects for a series of conflicting evidence. However, the tasks used in those
studies were not analytical procedures tasks. Asare and Messier (1991) note that in an
unpublished study, Bonner and Butler (1989) did not find recency effects in an analytical
procedures task. Confirmation bias (Church 1990) could also mitigate the effectiveness of
the decision aid. Confirmation bias exists when individuals tend to overweight evidence
that supports their initial beliefs. Auditors who initially believe the client could be more
likely to disregard the decision aid report, resulting in a non-significant finding.
However, Smith and Kida (1991) find that auditor’s conservatism precludes the use of
confirmatory strategies. Since participants are practicing auditors, confirmation bias is
unlikely.
5.3.3 Experimental Context
The experimental context is also a limitation. The sterility of an online experiment
cannot capture the face-to-face interactions present in an actual audit. When faced with
individuals that they know personally and with whom they have a working relationship
and history, auditors may subconsciously make different judgments than they would in an
experimental setting. In-group bias in an audit context might be more subtle and difficult
to recreate in an experimental setting. This study is also limited to positive prior

20

Asare and Messier (1991) provide an in-depth summary of belief adjustment audit research.
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relationships between the parties. Circumstances in which the past relationship is
negative could result in different findings.
The online method of data collection has limitations as well. The researcher
cannot observe participants as they proceed through the survey; this lack of supervision
reduces experimental control. Participants can engage in multiple tasks (e.g., surfing the
web, talking on the phone, answering e-mails) while completing the online survey.
Participants can also leave the computer and return later leaving the researcher to guess
whether the extra time spent online was, in fact, representative of added effort or lack of
effort. In this particular study, an additional limitation arose from the recruiting method.
The researcher had no control over which auditors at a firm took the survey. Therefore,
selection bias could have been a factor in the results. Auditors who took the survey could
have been the “less capable” auditors with more free time. On the other hand, partners
could have selected the “more capable” auditors to answer the survey in order to present
their firm in the best light.
5.4 Future Research
There are several avenues for future research including addressing research
design weaknesses, using alternative research methods, extending research parameters,
and altering the decision aid. As noted above, the research design was limited. Recency
provides an alternative explanation to findings of decision aid effectiveness. Prior
research suggests a recency effect for mixed evidence in a content-rich audit setting
(Tubbs et al. 1990). This issue could be addressed by including a group that receives the
decision aid concurrently with the client explanation and comparing that group with predecision aid judgments. A large number of participants (11 out of 55 or 20%) failed the
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between-subjects group affiliation manipulation check. While the removal of these
observations is justified, the smaller sample size reduced the power of the study. Future
trials can be modified to make the group manipulation more salient. Alternatively,
researchers can require participants to respond to a set of questions that ensures they are
aware of the manipulation before proceeding with the experiment.
Another avenue for future research is to use an alternative research method. Given
that in-group bias appears sensitive to face-to-face cues, an experiment that uses actual
firm auditors interacting with participants could improve results. An archival approach
using working papers for completed audits would provide a richer data set. By analyzing
auditors’ work, I could explore whether auditor judgments and decisions differ based on
the presence/absence of an affiliated client.
A natural and relevant extension of this research is to vary the participants of
interest. Archival studies including Lennox (2005) and Menon and Williams (2004) find
evidence of affiliation bias at the partner level. Based on the current study, there is some
evidence that seniors exhibit bias, while staff members do not. Using managers and
partners in an experimental study could reveal stronger biases. Another extension would
explore affiliation at various levels; for example, does affiliation (in-group bias) occur
between members of the same office, the same firm, or even between Big Four group
members? In addition, does in-group bias depend on the audit task? This study used a
single task, analytical procedures related to expense accounts, often completed by a lower
level employee. Given the multitude of tasks completed during an audit, it would be
worthwhile to explore tasks that have a larger impact on the final audit opinion (e.g.,
evaluation of a going concern). As a final point, given the effectiveness of the decision
aid report, future research should investigate the development and effectiveness of
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decision aids in audit practice. Eining et al. (1997) find that constructive dialogue, a form
of interaction between participants and the decision aid, auditor performance. The
decision aid in this study could be modified to include an interactive component. The
current study found that staff auditors relied heavily on their plausibility judgments in
making the decision to extend testing. Given the link between judgments and decisionmaking, it is worthwhile to study how decision aids can improve audit practice.
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Appendix A
Background Material21 and DecisionSERVE Report
Client Background
Continental Transport Inc. is one of North America's largest logistics companies, with
operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America, Europe, and Asia. Most
of their revenue comes from providing truck, rail, ocean, and air transportation
throughout the world.
Continental Transport Inc. works with Fortune 500/Blue Chip companies and familyowned and start-up businesses. They develop logistics plans and provide the people,
transportation, and execution to make the plans work. Their 2,000+ motor carriers
provide flatbed, temperature controlled, expedited, and special handling services. They
are publicly owned and traded on the NASDAQ. They have 27 offices and 750
employees.
Continental Transport, Inc.
Income Statement
FYE 12/31/05, 12/31/04
(unaudited)
(in thousands)
Revenue:
Transportation
Revenue
Cost of
Transportation:
Fuel and
Depreciation
Repair and
Maintenance
Total Cost:
Gross Profit
Total selling,
general, and
administrative
expenses
Income from
operations
Net interest
expense
Income before
taxes
Provision for
income tax
Net Income

21

Actual
Change

Percent
Change

12/31/2004

12/31/2003

284,593

251,721

32,872

13.06%

238,123

210,590

27,533

13.07%

6,532

3,862

2,670

69.14%

244,655
39,938

214,452
37,269

30,203
2,669

14.08%
7.06%

24,470

24,203

267

1.10%

15,468

13,066

2,402

18.38%

87

64

23

35.94%

15,555

13,130

2,425

18.47%

(7,196)

(6,158)

(1,038)

16.86%

8,359

6,972

1,387

19.89%

Information adapted from CH Robinson Worldwide Inc. website and Financial Statements.
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Continental Transport, Inc.
Balance Sheet
FYE 12/31/05, 12/31/04
(unaudited)
(In thousands)

12/31/2004

12/31/2003

%
Change

Current Liabilities

35,850

31,468

13.93%

Total Long-term Liabilities

57,580

43,542

32.24%

8,400

8,400

0%

9,668

9,668

0%

12/31/2004 12/31/2003 % Change

Current Assets

91,393

85,333

7.10%

Land

15,000

15,000

0%

Buildings

26,000

26,000

0%

Vehicles

52,844

29,749

77.63%

Property, Plant and
Equipment

(Less accumulated
depreciation)

Stockholders’ Equity

Net Property, Plant and
Equipment
Goodwill, net of
accumulated amortization
Other Assets
Total Assets

(46,719)

(44,273)

5.52%

47,125

26,476

77.99%

Additional Paid in Capital

15,297

15,297

0%

550

480

14.58%

154,365

127,586

Common Stock

20.99%

Retained Earnings

42,867

34,508

24.22%

Total Stockholders’ Equity

60,935

52,576

15.9%

Total Liabilities and Stockholders’
Equity

154,365

127,586

20.99%

DecisionSERVE Report
Possible Explanations for Unexpected Increases in Repair and Maintenance
Client: Continental Transport, FYE 2005

Reason
Increase in volume
Increase in labor rates
Repair rather than replace fixed
assets
Fictitious Payments/Billings

Information
Source
Income
Statement
Income
Statement

Related
Accounts

Expected
Direction

Sales

Increase

Salary

Increase

Either No
Change or
Decrease
Evidence may be found through additional
substantive testing.

Balance Sheet

102

PP&E

About the Author
Dr. Eileen Zalkin Taylor was born in Liberty, New York and raised in Tampa,
Florida. She is married to Glenn Taylor and has three children, Adam, Jordan, and
Isabella. She earned her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Master of
Accountancy, and Doctor of Philosophy degrees at the University of South Florida (USF)
in Tampa.
Before enrolling in the Ph.D. program, Dr. Taylor worked for Deloitte and
Touche, was a controller for the Tampa Orlando Pinellas Jewish Foundation, and taught
as an adjunct for the USF School of Accountancy.
She has received several awards and scholarships during her time at USF. She
was awarded best research paper at the American Accounting Association’s Accounting
Information System’s mid-year meeting, 2004.
Dr. Taylor is interested in behavioral research that aids accounting and audit
practice. She plans to investigate accounting information systems and knowledge sharing
in organizations, as well as ethics in auditing firms.

129

